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Thesis supervised by Professor Daniel P. Scheid, Ph.D. 
 Josef Pieper’s practical moral philosophy can be best understood by reference to the 
theology of Thomas Aquinas, and specifically Aquinas’ concept of the created human person. 
Pieper uses Aquinas’ theological anthropology to argue for three actions which respond to the 
reality of being created: giving assent to having been brought into existence by God, perceiving 
God and created reality, and pursuing of the end of human life through the practice of the virtues 
in order to receive beatitude. 
Pieper’s well-known works on the seven virtues, on leisure, and on festivity rely on the 
same concepts from Aquinas which Pieper examines in depth in his works of speculative 
philosophy. By providing context for each of the selected works, this thesis demonstrates the 
unity of Pieper’s speculative and practical moral philosophy as well as his conception of the ideal 
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JOSEF PIEPER’S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY 
Josef Pieper was a moral philosopher whose life and work spanned the twentieth 
century. Born in Germany, Pieper studied philosophy and law during the massive 
upheavals that accompanied the aftermath of World War I and the interwar period and 
began his professional life in the lead up to the second World War. In this context of rapid 
change in his society, Pieper wrote essays which opposed his culture’s prevailing views 
of work, virtue, and leisure. Pieper’s primary project was an effort to consider anew the 
Western philosophical tradition and challenge his social context to grapple with the truths 
contained within it. During his life, Pieper both opposed false conceptions of human 
nature and proposed ways for each person to become more humane by living in 
accordance with what human nature truly is.  
To understand the work of Josef Pieper, it is crucial to understand the concepts 
that underlie his work. Pieper adopted Saint Thomas Aquinas' position that humans were 
created with the capacity to attend to the created world; consequently, a person who 
rejects this createdness is unable to fully perceive reality, and ultimately unable to act in 
accordance with the virtues. Thus, Aquinas’ metaphysics of creation provides necessary 
context for Pieper’s practical works of moral philosophy. Several of Pieper's best-known 
works, those on the seven virtues as well as In Tune with the World: A Theory of Festivity 
and Leisure, the Basis of Culture, do not detail Pieper's views on human createdness, so it 
is possible to misunderstand his arguments by reading those works in isolation from his 
speculative moral philosophy and work on Aquinas. This thesis proposes a framework 





about moral action in the world. 
BIOGRAPHY 
 Josef Pieper’s boyhood, and much of the rest of his life, was spent living in and 
around the city of Munster, Germany. He was raised Catholic and remained a practicing 
Catholic through the end of his life. Through a former Dominican who taught at his 
secondary school, Pieper first encountered the writing of Thomas Aquinas.1 Pieper was 
involved with the German youth movement immediately after the end of the first World 
War. In 1924, at an event sponsored by the youth movement, he heard a lecture by 
Romano Guardini which spurred him to study Aquinas seriously as a philosopher.2 Pieper 
matriculated at the University of Munich in the faculty of theology but switched to 
philosophy in order to answer questions about the place of the person within creation, to 
“[fix] his mind’s eye on the totality of being, the world.”3   
During graduate school, Pieper studied seriously under Erich Przywara at a series 
of summer seminars; these will be addressed in more detail below. In this period, Pieper 
also encountered people who would later be recognized as significant figures in twentieth 
century Catholicism, including Hans Urs von Balthasar, Edith Stein, and Marc Sangnier. 
He notes in his autobiography that during his secular education in philosophy in pre-
WWII Germany, there was very little interest in studying anything written before the 
modern era, and much of his familiarity with the theologians and philosophers he 
frequently cites (Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Augustine, and so on) was acquired either in 
 
1 Josef Pieper, No One Could Have Known, An Autobiography: The Early Years 1904-1945 (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1987). 46. 
2 Pieper, No One Could Have Known. 62. 






secondary school or at his own initiative.4 After graduating with his doctorate in 
philosophy, Pieper was employed for a period by a sociological institute; he resigned 
from that position coinciding nearly with, though not because of, the rise of the National 
Socialist party to power in Germany.5 After his resignation in 1933 and until the end of 
World War II, he worked as a freelance writer because he was unable to be employed at a 
university under the Nazi regime. During the war, he had a position in the Luftwaffe as an 
examining psychologist, to which he was appointed because of his training in sociology. 
In general, Pieper was regarded by the Nazi regime as potentially disloyal, both because 
of the ideas he espoused, and because his wife's brother had married a Jewish woman.6  
 Immediately after the war, and for many years afterwards, he supported himself 
by lecturing at the University of Munster and at a teacher training college in Essen, 
Germany.7 Although offered professorships at multiple institutions including at Munster, 
Gottingen, Cologne, and Munich,8 Pieper refused these offers for more than a decade, 
preferring to continue teaching and lecturing to non-specialists rather than those in 
training for degrees in philosophy.9 He also lectured and traveled widely in Europe. In 
1950, he began to take semester-long teaching positions at various American institutions 
such as the University of Notre Dame and Stanford University.10 Pieper also travelled and 
lectured in a number of Asian countries; one specific trip will be discussed later. Pieper 
did eventually accept a full professorship at the University of Munster. Pieper had several 
 
4 Pieper, No One Could Have Known. 65. 
5 Pieper, No One Could Have Known. 87. 
6 Pieper, No One Could Have Known. 127, 157, 161. 
7 Josef Pieper, Not Yet the Twilight: An Autobiography 1945-1964 (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 
2015). 11; 14. 
8 Pieper, Not Yet the Twilight. 28, 175, 182. 
9 Pieper, Not Yet the Twilight. 30-1. 





reasons for remaining a lecturer and writer to general audiences well into his forties. He 
desired to provide “an academic education for the people… converting the multilingual 
existence of the Western intellectual tradition into the living form of the German 
language.”11 He was also interested in the attempt to “make [himself] comprehensible, in 
[his] philosophizing, to the ordinary listener” and to always keep in mind the question 
“What does it mean?” rather than resorting to “technical language” when possible.12  
PIEPER’S PHILOSOPHY 
Pieper resisted attempts to class him as a theologian for considering “pre-
philosophical data”13 within his work. It is notable that later in his career, Pieper 
references Aristotle and Plato, especially Plato, at least as much as Christian 
theologians.14 He also typically cites the Christian Bible to illustrate various cultures 
rather than as an authority to justify his position. Pieper intentionally does not base his 
arguments upon divine revelation, which is also Aquinas’ distinction between philosophy 
and theology.15 On the other hand, Pieper’s moral philosophy does engage deeply with 
Christian revelation and should be identified with the Christian philosophical tradition 
because one of Pieper’s first principles is that the human person has been created by the 
Christian God. Many of his works conclude that the end of human existence is to know 
 
11 Pieper, Not Yet the Twilight. 176. 
12 Pieper, Not Yet the Twilight. 177. 
13 Bernard N.  Schumacher, "The Twofold Discipleship of the Philosopher: Faith and Reason in the 
Thought of Josef Pieper," in A Cosmpolitan Hermit: Modernity and Tradition in the Philosophy of Josef 
Pieper, ed. Bernard N. Schumacher (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 
2009). 199. 
14 Juan F. Franck, "The Platonic Inspiration of Pieper's Philosophy," in A Cosmopolitan Hermit: Modernity 
and Tradition in the Philosophy of Josef Pieper., ed. Bernard N. Schumacher (Washington, DC.: CUA 
Press, 2009). 251. 
15 Thomas Aquinas, "Summa Theologiae," ed. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: 





and contemplate God, following from the Catholic Christian foundation for Pieper's 
moral philosophy. Rather than reading Pieper in the context of modern philosophy, which 
even when practiced by Christians maintains a secular character, Pieper ought to be read 
as a philosopher in the tradition of pre-modern philosophy. His moral philosophy 
provides a model for engagement with both the historical Christian tradition as well as 
with one’s contemporary context. More specifically, Pieper’s philosophical work provides 
a foundation for identifying issues relevant to contemporary theology.   
By tracing three themes related to human createdness—assent to being, perception 
of reality, and pursuit of the end of human life—in Pieper’s speculative philosophy and 
identifying their use in Aquinas’ thought, it is possible to better understand Pieper’s 
works on the virtuous life. Despite discussion in the literature of the Pieper’s 
understanding of these three ideas, there have been few attempts to systematically trace 
any of these three themes through multiple of Pieper’s essays. In addition, Pieper's works 
are typically read individually, rather than in context. Many essays primarily reference 
Leisure, the Basis of Culture or his works on Aquinas, and connections between his 
works have been less studied than his contemporaries.  
Almost as soon as he began to write, Pieper was translated and read across the 
world, particularly by those influenced by Thomas Aquinas. For example, his 
autobiography reports that his works on the four cardinal virtues were in the library of 
Pope John XXIII.16 A list of those who have often cited, written about, or introduced 
Pieper’s works includes many of the luminaries of twentieth century theology, 
philosophy, and ethics, although as Wald notes, Pieper has been often referenced but 
 





infrequently engaged at great depth.17 Ralph McInerny, a Thomist whose tenure at Notre 
Dame spanned more than a half a century, was instrumental in seeing many of Pieper’s 
works translated into English.  
Gilbert Meilaender describes Pieper’s essays on the virtues as an early example of 
the return to Aristotelian and Platonic moral philosophy which occurred in the twentieth 
century. In the Anglophone world, this can be seen in the works of Iris Murdoch, G.E.M. 
Anscombe, Alasdair MacIntyre, and the virtue ethics tradition in general.18 However, 
despite the similarity in themes between English-language virtue ethicists and Pieper, a 
review of the literature shows almost no engagement in either direction. Pieper responds 
directly to primarily German philosophers, although he did read English writers and was 
deeply influenced by Saint John Henry Cardinal Newman. A review of the works of 
major virtue ethicists show little to no awareness of Pieper. A fruitful direction for further 
research would be to compare Pieper’s essays on specific virtues with major accounts of 
the virtues put forth by Anglophone virtue ethicists. One of the few essays to situate 
Pieper in the context of twentieth century philosophy was written by Berthold Wald for A 
Cosmopolitan Hermit. In the essay, Wald compares Pieper’s work to major figures in the 
virtue ethics tradition, including Alasdair MacIntyre, Elizabeth Anscombe, and Richard 
Hare.19 He argues that where there are differences between Pieper and contemporary 
virtue ethicists, that difference is often rooted in Pieper’s Catholic anthropology.20  
Bernard Schumacher’s introductory essay to A Cosmopolitan Hermit, the only 
 
17 Berthold Wald, "Josef Pieper in the Context of Modern Philosophy," in A Cosmopolitan Hermit: 
Modernity and Tradition in the Philosophy of Josef Pieper., ed. Bernard N. Schumacher (Washington, DC.: 
CUA Press, 2009). 24. 
18 Gilbert Meilaender, "Josef Pieper: Explorations in the Thought of a Philosopher of Virtue," Journal of 
Religious Ethics 11, no. 1 (1983).  
19 Wald, "Josef Pieper in the Context of Modern Philosophy." 





comprehensive academic treatment of Josef Pieper’s thought, provides an overview of 
major themes in Pieper’s work. Schumacher refers to the metaphysics of creation as the 
“secret key” to Pieper’s philosophy,21 and points out essential elements of his reliance on 
the concept. At the beginning of his career, Pieper was influenced by Plato, Aquinas, and 
Romano Guardini, writing his thesis and habilitation on “the basis for moral human 
action and the truth of things”22 which is the existence of reality outside the human self. 
Pieper’s argument is that “every good moral human action has its first origin in the silent 
contemplation of the truth of things.”23 While studying under Erich Przywara, Pieper 
began to argue that “the real cannot be enclosed within any system of thought,” which 
influenced his resistance to regarding scholasticism as a closed system. Pieper’s works on 
the virtues are based on an anthropology of man “on the way.”24 After being hired as a 
lecturer in 1946, Pieper began to reflect on topics including education, culture, the rising 
totalitarian culture of work, and “the philosophical act” which is not useful, although not 
lacking in purpose or meaning.25 
Throughout his work, Pieper addresses two related but separate relationships 
between the virtues. The first relationship is between the natural virtues as they are 
practiced by any individual Christian person; does a Christian necessarily experience 
conflict between the natural form of fortitude and the grace-infused form of fortitude? 
More generally, do the natural virtues necessarily conflict with the theological virtues? 
The second relationship is between the virtues in general: are all the virtues related in 
 
21 Bernard N.  Schumacher, "A Cosmopolitan Hermit: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Josef Pieper," 
in A cosmpolitan hermit: Modernity and tradition in the philosophy of Josef Pieper, ed. Bernard N. 
Schumacher (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2009). 14. 
22 Schumacher, "Cosmopolitan Hermit." 4. 
23 Schumacher, "Cosmopolitan Hermit." 6. 
24 Schumacher, "Cosmopolitan Hermit." 11. 





some fundamental which gives them some sort of unified quality?26 The ethicist Gilbert 
Meilaender addressed the first question at some length in his work The Theory and 
Practice of Virtue. While the second question will be addressed throughout this work, 
Meilaender’s Theory and Practice is most useful for addressing the first question. 
Meilaender argues that Pieper only sometimes makes clear whether he believes that the 
theological virtues are in some way opposed to the natural virtues.27 He notes that Pieper 
most clearly discusses this relationship in his essays on prudence and charity. Both 
prudence and charity are continuous in the sense that they operate in the same manner in 
their natural and grace-infused forms, yet they can conflict because their objects are often 
opposed and usually different.28 Meilaender’s fundamental criticism of Pieper is that 
Pieper pays insufficient attention to the reality of sin in the world and the problem of 
competing goods in the moral life.29 However, Meilaender also notes that Pieper’s goal 
was not to theorize but “to transmit and revitalize a Thomist vision of the virtuous 
life.”30   
As noted above, existing scholarship on Pieper sometimes focuses narrowly on 
individual essays. For example, Aquinas Guilbeau, O.P. published an enlightening essay 
on the relationship between fortitude and leisure: leisure can only be attained through the 
practice of the virtue of fortitude.31 Guilbeau argues that in Pieper’s work on leisure, the 
focus on the will and intellect minimizes the need for formation in the virtues, 
 
26 The second question will be addressed throughout the rest of the work, but it is important to raise since 
the relationship between all the virtues and the relationship between the natural and theological virtues are 
27 Gilbert Meilaender, The Theory and Practice of Virtue (South Bend, IN.: Notre Dame Press, 1984). 28. 
28 Meilaender, Theory and Practice. 35-40. 
29 Meilaender, Theory and Practice. 35. 
30 Meilaender, "Josef Pieper: Explorations in the Thought of a Philosopher of Virtue." 






particularly magnanimity and humility, which allow for the pursuit of leisure by ordering 
the passions.32 By primarily reading Leisure, the Basis of Culture, Guilbeau neglects 
other works by Pieper which address the issue he raises more directly. It is true Pieper 
does not discuss the virtues that allow for the achievement of leisure to the degree 
Guilbeau would like to see in Leisure. However, Pieper’s essays On Fortitude and On 
Hope both contain extended discussions of the virtues of humility and magnanimity and 
their relationship to leisure, with reference to the specific questions Guilbeau faults 
Pieper for not referencing.  
Though the scholarly literature on Pieper is thin compared to the literature 
discussing many of his contemporaries, Pieper has attracted more attention in recent 
years, particularly from younger scholars. The essay collection referenced above, A 
Cosmpolitan Hermit, contains a number of technical articles about Pieper’s philosophy. 
Other essays and reviews of Pieper’s work often note his insistence that leisure and 
contemplation are necessary (and, in the modern world, absent) for a humane life. For 
example, Nathaniel Warne has considered how prudence and Pieper's idea of negative 
philosophy can improve the study and practice of science.33 Vincent Wargo has also 
addressed Pieper’s works on the virtues and his theory of history.34 Yet as a whole, the 
secondary literature on Josef Pieper is narrow in scope or concerned with other themes 
than the topic of this work. Excepting a number of other essays by the authors listed 
above and two doctoral theses which are unavailable except by application to the authors, 
 
32 Guilbeau, "The Courage to Rest: Thomas Aquinas on the Soul of Leisure." 40, 43. 
33 Nathaniel A. Warne, "Learning to See the World Again: Josef Pieper on Philosophy, Prudence, and the 
University.," Moral Education 47, no. 3 (2018). "Of All Things, Seen and Unseen: Josef Pieper's 
Negative Philosophy, Science, and Hope.," Theological Studies 79, no. 2 (2018). 
34 “Vincent Wargo, "Festivity, tradition, and hope: Josef Pieper and the historical meaning of human 
praxis," Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought & Culture 21, no. 4 (2018). "Josef Pieper on the nature of 





Pieper's corpus has not been addressed as a unified body of work. Much remains to be 
said about his conception of the world.  
Pieper deeply engaged with the “Western tradition” particularly as found in 
Aquinas’ writings, frequently returning to Aquinas because of his charity to his 
interlocutors and openness to seeking the truth wherever it could be found.35 Pieper 
regarded himself as a true philosopher rather than a historian of philosophy, who aimed to 
discover the “truth of things”; he was thus open to engagement with existential and 
nihilist philosophers, as well as with Christian contemporaries and predecessors. This 
openness can serve as a model for the theologian or philosopher willing to engaging with 
the problems identified by the modern and post-modern worlds, while remaining rooted 
in a specific tradition. Both Pieper and Aquinas shared this orientation toward truth which 
allowed for philosophers who might not have otherwise been considered acceptable to the 
Catholic “Western tradition” to be appropriated for discussion. This makes Pieper an 
important resource for encountering our pluralistic world. 
Assent to reality, perception of reality, and the pursuit of the end are the three 
structuring ideas from Aquinas’ metaphysics of creation which I have identified as crucial 
to Pieper’s thought. The second chapter will discuss the meaning of these three key 
concepts as understood by Pieper, to orient the reader to his use of the concepts. This will 
be followed by an analysis of the relationship between leisure and festivity, because of 
the importance of those elements in Pieper’s idea of the end of human life as it can be 
experienced on earth. The third chapter will look more closely at how Aquinas discusses 
 
35 Josef Pieper, "On Thomas Aquinas," in The Silence of St. Thomas: Three Essays (South Bend: St. 
Augustine Press, 1999). 20, 32. "Preface," in The Four Cardinal Virtues 





the concepts of being, perception, and end. This chapter will draw out texts which give 
context for Aquinas’ idea of creation. The final chapter will address three areas of 
Pieper’s work on the moral life, examining them in the context of the proposed 
framework. After sections introducing Pieper’s seven essays on the virtues, Leisure, the 
Basis of Culture, a polemic against the modern tendency to order life to work rather than 
rest, will be examined for insight on the way that assent to human createdness creates the 
space to pursue leisure. Then, Pieper’s idea of the possibility of experiencing the end of 
human life during life on earth will be examined through a reading of A Theory of 
Festivity, which is a positive vision for the recovery of the divine festival in public life. 
These discussions will be followed by a conclusion which discusses the radical nature of 
Pieper’s assessment of modern life, and what the reader of Pieper ought to take away 







CHAPTER 2:  
FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING PIEPER 
Before discussing Thomas Aquinas’ metaphysics of creation and the end of human 
existence, it is important to understand how Pieper understands these concepts. Pieper’s 
use of Aquinas’ thought enables Pieper to link his proposals for how to live a virtuous life 
to the objective, real world which exists independent of the perceiving person. This 
chapter will provide a framework for understanding Pieper's practical moral philosophy 
based on Aquinas' metaphysics of creation, by discussing how human perception of 
reality, and the ultimate purpose and destination of all creation, relates to moral action. 
For Pieper, these two elements—perception and end—are deeply interrelated aspects of 
existence. Because these concepts are discussed more in Pieper’s speculative philosophy 
and commentary on Aquinas than in his practical moral philosophy, Pieper’s works 
Happiness and Contemplation and The Silence of St. Thomas, will be referenced. After 
discussing Pieper’s understanding of Aquinas’ metaphysics of creation, the next chapter 
will explore these concepts in context. Then, this framework will be applied to Pieper’s 
practical moral philosophy.  
Pieper’s works on the virtuous life consistently propose the same actions in 
response to the order of the created universe.1 The proper response to being is to assent to 
being. The response to truth is to perceive the truth of reality. The response to the desire 
 
1 For the purposes of this paper, this includes Pieper’s seven essays on the virtues, Leisure, the Basis of 
Culture, and In Tune with the World: A Theory of Festivity. Pieper did write other essays in addition to these 
which could be said also address the virtuous life, including additional essays on some of the virtues, such 





for goodness is to pursue goodness by seeking the end toward which human nature is 
aimed. Pieper thus argues that the virtuous life is lived by acting in accordance with the 
realities of being, truth, and goodness as are understood according to the western 
Christian tradition, and principally Aquinas. These responses are not a linear progression 
but build upon and reinforce each other. For example, by pursuing goodness through the 
practice of the virtue of love in particular ways, over time a person is able to affirm the 
goodness of a particular person more fully and concretely. Because Pieper holds to the 
ultimate unity of the seven classical virtues of Western philosophy, each virtue must share 
some characteristics of all the other virtues.2 The practice of the virtues over time enables 
a person to act more fully in accord with human nature.  
ASSENTING TO CREATEDNESS 
Pieper’s understanding of Aquinas was not initially well received in Germany, but 
it has lasting relevance for the interpretation of Pieper’s own work.  In his essay on 
 
2 
The theory that the virtues have an underlying unity has not been accepted without controversy in the 
twentieth century. Two important accounts are given by Vlastos and Langan. Vlastos proposes that 
Socrates’ Protogoras is a coherent articulation of the unity of the virtues, arguing a single thesis in three 
stages. That thesis is that “having any virtue entails having every virtue … by saying that what names each 
names all, and that they are all cogeners, all alike.” Vlastos reads Socrates as arguing that to have a virtue a 
person must necessarily possess wisdom (Gregory Vlastos, "The Unity of the Virtues in the "Protogoras"," 
The Review of Metaphysics 25, no. 3 (1972). 425.) Virtues are to be interpreted as unified not as universals 
but as “coextensive classes”, and individual virtuous acts necessarily possess the qualities of the other 
virtues (Vlastos, "Protogoras." 436, 439.) Langan, following Penner, finds that the underlying “unity” of 
the virtues is best understood as a “motive force” or “principle of action” which underlies all virtuous acts 
(John P. Langan, "Augustine on the Unity and the Interconnection of the Virtues," The Harvard Theological 
Review 72, no. 1/2. 83.) The virtue Augustine identifies as “the explanatory entity that accounts for, and so 
is effectively present in, the cardinal virtues” is charity (Langan, "Augustine." 91.) Augustine, however, in 
identifying the source of the unity of the virtues as charity makes it difficult or impossible to ascribe virtue 
to non-Christians (Langan, "Augustine." 93.) Langan’s understanding of a virtue as a “motive force” 
accords with Aquinas’ understanding of a virtue as a habit, an understanding to which Pieper subscribes. 
Vlastos’ reading of Socrates similarly accords with Aquinas, for whom virtues are connected because any 
virtue must be accompanied by prudence (Aquinas, "ST." I-II, 65, 1). Overall, Pieper’s conception of the 
unity of the virtue is more closely aligned with Socrates,’ since in Pieper’s moral philosophy, prudence 





Aquinas’ negative philosophy—that is, philosophy which works by elimination of what is 
unknown, rather than by assertion of what is known—Pieper argues that Aquinas 
conceives of creation not in the abstract, but very concretely in the sense of “created 
things.” Pieper also adopts Aquinas’ division of everything that can be known into 
“creatura or Creator.”3 Pieper says that Aquinas' idea that all things which have existence 
exist as created underlies “nearly all the basic concepts in St. Thomas's philosophy of 
being.” This means that all that exists or has reality has been created by the Creator, God.  
Furthermore, everything that exists as created has an internal structure or nature 
which has been deliberately designed to conform to a certain plan.4 Creaturae “have been 
fashioned by thought”—God’s thought—and designed to exist according to this nature. 
They can be described as true insofar as they conform to that design.5 (In fact, whether an 
object has been made by man, an artifact, or created by God: every object, animal, spirit, 
and person has a given nature.)6 That things exist because they are created by God is not 
only a statement about the Creator but also about creation: “things exist because God sees 
them”; all things “are formed after an archetypal pattern which dwells in the mind of 
God.”7 It is also a statement about the human ability to have contact with any other 
creatura, “something that has ‘flamed up’ directly from God.”8 In his acceptance of 
created human nature, Pieper explicitly rejects philosophers who deny there is such a 
 
3 Pieper, "The Negative Element in the Philosophy of St. Thomas." 49. 
4 Pieper, "Negative Philosophy." 51. 
5 Pieper, "Negative Philosophy." 53. 
6 Christian theology typically affirms that this is in an analogous way true of God. God is His will and His 
intellect; God is identical with his being. Although God has not been created or fashioned by anything else, 
God does have a nature which is stable. 
7 Josef Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation, trans. Clara and Richard Winston (South Bend: St. 
Augustine's Press, 1998). 61. 






thing.9 Pieper specifically positions himself in direct opposition to Sartre’s atheistic 
existentialism by affirming the doctrine of creation, but views his project as a consistent 
interpretation of the world, insofar as Sartre argues from the position that there is no 
God.10  
For Pieper, human desire is only satisfied by things that really exist outside the 
person. The human desire for happiness is oriented entirely toward the “real universe”; 
“man desires satiation by reality.”11 But before individual created things can be affirmed 
as good, assent to the goodness of creation in general must be given.12 Pieper notes that 
our response to any good created thing tends to universalize; we affirm more than the 
specific good alone. Characteristically interested in alternate witnesses to the human 
search for the truth, Pieper references love poetry as pointing to the universal human 
desire for what is good.13 Although God is not a part of the world but within and outside 
it, Pieper asserts that we can also reach God because we have been created to be able to 
communicate with him.14  
Pieper identifies Aquinas’ interest in Aristotle as deriving from Aristotle’s 
“affirmation of the concrete and sensuous reality of the world” which allowed him to 
develop a more robust “Christian affirmation of Creation.”15 This orientation toward 
external, created reality can be identified as “worldliness” but that was not Aquinas’ 
 
9 Pieper, "Negative Philosophy." 53. 
10 Pieper, "Negative Philosophy." 52. 
11 Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation. 64. 
12 Although it need not be explicitly thought, it must be at least subconsciously affirmed. Josef Pieper, In 
Tune with the World: A Theory of Festivity (South Bend: St. Augustine's Press, 1999). 26. 
13 Pieper, Festivity. 27. 
14 Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation. 79. 





intent. The goal of Aquinas’ inclusion of philosophical approaches to “natural reality as a 
whole… visible, sense-perceived… material things [as well as] the natural cognitive 
power of reason”16 in his theology rather than simply appealing to Christian revelation 
was his conviction that secular truth, insofar as it reflects reality, also has bearing on the 
experience of the Christian person in the world. To attend only to revelation risks a 
heretical devaluation of the created world and the embodied human person as well. 
Instead, Aquinas refers to the exterior created world as “the standard” or measure with 
which the person must reckon in order to ensure that her idea of reality is in accordance 
with reality as it exists.17 This idea will be returned to in the next section. It was Aquinas’ 
“all-inclusive, fearless strength of his affirmation, his generous acceptance of the whole 
of reality” which enabled Aquinas to affirm truth wherever it could be found in the world, 
including in the works of those with whom he disagreed. Pieper proposes that this 
affirming and welcoming attitude must be adopted in order to fully behold the truth of the 
world.18  
PERCEIVING REALITY 
What is reality? As discussed above, Pieper follows Aquinas in arguing reality is 
anything that has been is “creatively thought by God.”19 The perception of reality is, for 
Pieper, really possible by virtue of our created nature and the nature of the created world. 
Not only can we perceive reality, we can also to some extent perceive God. But the 
perception of both of these is limited; the same nature which allows us to perceive reality 
 
16 Pieper, Guide to Thomas Aquinas. 118. 
17 Pieper, Guide to Thomas Aquinas. 123.  
18 Pieper, "The Timeliness of Thomism." 103-104. 





also limits our perception of creatura and the Creator. Does this inability to see in whole 
mean that we therefore give up the search to know at all? No—because although we 
cannot see fully, we can still see in part; it is only because we see in part that we can 
discover that we cannot see in full.20 
Perception, an interior act of the intellect, is primarily directed to the real, exterior 
world. Furthermore, certain created things, including human beings, have the capability 
to perceive the material world because they have been created with that ability by God. 
Pieper argues that we can be confident that the world is real and able to be perceived if 
we assent to the proposition that we are created with that ability. While this perception is 
limited by our finitude it is real, despite reality surpassing our ability to understand it 
totally. The human mind is only able to know things because of the existence of God, 
who created human nature with this capacity for perception.21  
 
Human mind           ↔           things           ↔           God 
Human mind           ←           God 
 
Similarly, humanity is able to know other creaturae because the creatively 
knowing mind of God has created things such that they are knowable.22 To the extent that 
a thing has been designed by a human person, it can be fully known by others in its ideal 
form; but to the extent that it exists as creatura, human knowledge is unable to completely 
 
20 Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation. 68. 
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uncover the mystery of the thing, insofar as every creatura is rooted in the infinite depths 
of the mind of God.23 The conception of reality as the ‘measure’ or the shaping standard 
of the human mind is, for Pieper, a very important aspect of the relationship between 
created reality and the human mind.24 Aquinas notes that while human minds can 
‘measure’ things we make, our minds can neither measure other created things, nor fully 
perceive God. Furthermore, we can only know God through the mediation of things. God, 
however, both knows created things and knows individual people directly.25 Pieper 
describes this relation:  
 “we know the copy, but not the relation of the copy to the archetype, the 
correspondence between what has been designed and its first design. To 
repeat, we have no power of perceiving this correspondence by which the 
formal truth of things is constituted.”26  
It is not possible for us to fully understand the relationship between a thing and God.  
For Aquinas, the unknowability of creatura exists because of the weakness of our 
ability to know, not because the thing itself is unknowable. Pieper examines this idea at 
length in his brief essay on the Negative Element in Philosophy of St. Thomas. “Because 
Being is created, that is to say creatively thought by God, it is therefore 'in itself' light, 
radiant, and revealing” Pieper argues, because it partakes of the infinitely ordered and 
self-revealing nature of God. Any created object can never be fully known since as an 
element of its createdness, Pieper says, it is  
 
23 Pieper, "Negative Philosophy." 58. 
24 To measure something is to enable a person or rational being to conceive of something before it exists in 
such a way that it can be shaped according to an idea. For example, a carpenter gives measure to a bench 
according to the idea of the bench she created in her mind before cutting and assembling wood into the 
bench. For more on Pieper’s conception of reality as a measure, see Pieper’s The Truth of All Things.  
25 Thomas Aquinas, "Disputed Questions on Truth," (Intellex Past Masters Database). I, 1, 2. 





“something that has so much light that a particular finite faculty of 
knowledge cannot absorb it all… it is part of the very nature of things that 
their knowability can never be wholly exhausted by any finite intellect 
because these things are creatures, which means that the very element 
which makes them known must necessarily be at the same time the reason 
things are unfathomable.”27  
Because the essence of any creatura emerges from God, we cannot see the full depths of 
its being. A given kind of thing, or form, is knowable through the copies that exist; the 
originating idea contained within the mind of God is not knowable in full.28 “We have no 
proper means of knowing the distinctive element in things... [or] the essence of things.”29 
We can know the exemplar (an actualized thing) but not the type (the form or idea of a 
thing). 
To return to what was noted above: because we cannot know things wholly, we 
also cannot know God fully through things—because any finite created thing cannot 
perfectly represent the infinite God; and also because the human mind as creatura is “too 
crude and obtuse (imbicilitas intellectus nostri) to read in things even that information 
concerning God which they really contain.”30 Further, for Aquinas, “the special manner in 
which the Divine Perfection is imitated is what constitutes the special essence of a thing.” 
Thus, it is not possible for humans to fully grasp an essence, insofar as it is impossible for 
us to grasp the Divine.31 For Pieper, this double affirmation—that creaturae exist as 
‘seeable,’ and that humans as creaturae are unable to see other creaturae or the Creator in 
full—is necessary in order to understand how Aquinas is not an agnostic or a pure 
 
27 Pieper, "Negative Philosophy." 60. 
28 Pieper, "Negative Philosophy." 63. 
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rationalist.32 The human quest for knowledge cannot be complete but it is also not futile; 
it is, like human life, in status viator and characterized by “hope” in the context of “an 
embracing affirmation” which continually seeks to know more fully.33  
The perception of reality through cognition is the only way in which the exterior 
world is totally taken into the person.34 In fact, we have no way to have contact with the 
real world which is outside ourselves except through cognition. This is not to say that all 
forms of cognition are this perfect taking-in of reality. But the perfect form of taking-in-
reality, which Pieper describes using the terms “seeing, intuition, contemplation,” is a 
mode of cognition.35 Perception of reality is in itself a good we desire; “we want to know 
the truth at any cost, even if the truth should be frightful.”36 Once again—although we 
cannot see in full, we have been created to see, and we require the ability to know in 
order to be happy.  
PERCEIVING THE GOOD 
Having argued that created persons can perceive created reality, Pieper argues that 
it is also possible to perceive what is good. Virtuous actions are those actions which, 
having perceived the good, make it possible to attain the good which is the goal of human 
life. Before touching on virtuous action more specifically, it is important to understand 
 
32 Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation. 69. 
33 Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation. 70. 
34 Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation. 66. 
35 Note: Pieper does not give a theory of the forms of cognition in his shorter essays. His tendency is to 
elaborate on individual ideas without venturing into the extensive categorization present in other works on 
Aquinas. In Reality and the Good, Pieper presents his theory of cognition in more detail but does not 
develop a technical language to describe the various kinds of cognition. In general, he simply adopts 
Aquinas’ concepts. Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation. 69. 





what goodness is. Pieper most explicitly addresses his idea of goodness and the end in his 
work Happiness and Contemplation, so that text will be examined in detail in this 
section. As in most of his works, Pieper begins by examining the language he will use. 
Pieper considers and rejects the use of eudaimonia to describe the kind of happiness he 
describes. Seen the context of twentieth century virtue ethics, where the virtues are 
practiced to achieve eudaimonia, that is, “to flourish or live well,”37 Pieper’s rejection of 
eudaimonia is interesting.38 He instead adopts makarios, or its Latin equivalent beatus, in 
order to echo Aquinas’ use of “beatitude” and the use of makarios in the original Greek of 
the New Testament. Pieper selects these words for their suggestion of “men’s share in the 
untrammeled happiness of the gods.”39 Translations of Pieper’s work follow this 
preference and often use beatitude or blessedness where other philosophers might talk of 
human flourishing. The following review of his idea of happiness should be read in this 
light, that is, that Pieper defines human happiness as participation in divine happiness. 
Pieper, following Aquinas, argues from the position that that human nature desires 
happiness, and has no ability to not desire happiness.40 In contrast to his contemporaries, 
Pieper explicitly opposes this acknowledgment of the unchosen human longing for 
happiness to Kant’s idea of the supremacy of the will, referencing his Critique of 
Practical Reason and Foundations of the Metaphysic of Ethics.41 “Only if we understand 
man as a created being to the very depths of his spiritual existence can we meaningfully 
 
37 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000). 167. 
38 As noted above, it is unclear how familiar Pieper was with twentieth century virtue ethics and the 
available literature in English does not answer the question. Pieper was, however, very well-versed in 
Aristotle and cites him extensively, so his use of beatitude or blessedness can be assumed to be deliberate.   
39 Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation. 15. 
40 Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation. 20-1.  





conceive that the will has not the power to not want happiness.”42 As has been discussed, 
the denial of createdness is also the denial of human nature.  
Happiness, in order to be ultimate happiness, must be attainable and must not 
exclude the dimensions of human happiness which make happiness identifiable as 
happiness—that is, it is not legitimate to re-define happiness to the extent that it is 
unrecognizable.43 Yet the emotions of joy and pleasure themselves are not happiness; they 
are signs that an exterior good exists and has been possessed in some way. 44 “Joy is the 
response of a lover receiving what he loves.”45 What can produce this kind of ultimate 
happiness? The will’s infinite desire has been noted above: it is not love of any created 
good that can satisfy the will’s desire. Ultimately, the whole created world is insufficient 
to satisfy human desire:  
“Man as he is constituted, endowed as he is with a thirst for happiness, 
cannot have his thirst quenched in the finite realm; and if he thinks or 
behaves as if that were possible, he is misunderstanding himself, he is 
acting contrary to his own nature.”46  
It is impossible for creation to satisfy the desire within man, because as a spirit, the soul 
must be able to encounter and take into itself everything in the universe; and yet that 
“means that the finite spirit by virtue of its essence is unquenchable and insatiable—
unless it partakes of God.”47 
 
42 Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation. 23. 
43 Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation. 18. 
44 Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation. 46. 
45 Pieper, Festivity. 23. 
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For his definition of happiness Pieper takes as his starting point Thomas Aquinas' 
dictum in the Summa Contra Gentiles that “man's ultimate happiness consists in 
contemplation.”48 It is not intuitive that the intellectual act of contemplation provides 
happiness; yet the normal sources of pleasure people seek are not capable of providing 
final and complete satisfaction.49 Human nature has the ability, capacitas, to aim at an 
external reality as an object, even if that object is beyond our ability to take in in its 
entirety.50 It is assent to reality and the perception of reality which allow us to grasp 
goodness, the goal of human life. The ultimate end of human life is the attainment of 
perfect happiness, which is perfect union with God through contemplation. This 
partaking of God, “the utmost perfection to which man may attain, the fulfillment of his 
being, is visio beatificia.”51 This end can be variously thought of as a terminus (the end 
of the earthly journey), a goal, or as the ultimate satisfaction of human desires. Pieper 
argues that every person, not only philosophers, has the potential to achieve this “eternal 
contemplative happiness with God.”52  
Why is happiness contemplation of God specifically, and not another kind of 
earthly pleasure or joy? Only an infinite God can satisfy the will’s desire for endless 
goodness. And only through cognition can something exterior to the person be brought 
into the person.53 Through perception of reality, which requires assent to human 
createdness and assent to the existence of the Creator, humanity is able to contemplate 
 
48 Thomas Aquinas, "Summa Contra Gentiles " (Intellex Past Masters Database). 3, 37. 
49 Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation. 17. 
50 Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation. 42. 
51 Pieper, Festivity. 15. 
52 Ralph McInerny, "Introduction," in Happiness and Contemplation (South Bend: St. Augustine's Press, 
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God, the source of goodness.54 Only if God has created humanity with the ability to reach 
out to God can there be a possibility for communication with God. Without accepting 
createdness, Pieper sees no possibility of ultimate happiness in the sense of beatitude, 
being filled with all possible goodness.  
Pieper suggests that perception is most perfect when what is beheld is loved by 
the person who sees. “There are things which the lover alone observes... the lover 
partakes of goods which are withheld from all others.”55 There is a kind of awareness 
which can only be attained by a person who loves. That loving is contemplation, 
“intuition of the beloved object.”56 Pieper identifies three elements to contemplation. 
First, it is “silent perception of reality”, intuiting what is present.57 Second, it is not 
arrived at by a process of reasoning but through reception or intuition alone; here Pieper 
borrows the distinction used by Aquinas between ratio or discursive reasoning and 
intellectus or simple intuition.58 Pieper almost exclusively uses ‘seeing’ to denote that 
immediate perception which is intuition. Third, Pieper notes that the traditional definition 
of contemplation has included amazement, which is specifically the reaction of a created, 
finite soul to something that has been revealed.59 Contemplation can take different forms. 
While all are characterized by “the loving, yearning, affirming bent toward that happiness 
which is the same as God Himself,”60 contemplation is often a loving affirmation of 
earthly things. Contemplation looks to the heart of created realities and sees the reflected 
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glory of God there.61 
 Since, Pieper argues, the highest form of happiness is contemplation of God, is 
happiness possible on earth? It is absolutely true that the most perfect satisfaction of this 
desire takes place in heaven, but Western Christianity has consistently affirmed that 
within “historical existence” it is possible to experience this “focusing of an inner gaze” 
on something which can be imperfectly seen, but seen in some capacity, nonetheless.62 
What is seen through earthly contemplation is, in part, the revelation that there is a deeper 
kind of perception than earthly contemplation. Yet though earthly contemplation leaves a 
person longing, it “is able to quench man's thirst more than anything else because it 
affords a direct perception of the presence of God.”63 As it has been established above, 
contemplation is direct perception or intuition, not discursive reasoning or 'thinking' 
proper. Objection to contemplation as the highest happiness is rooted in a rejection of the 
world as either fundamentally good or as a creation. “Neither happiness nor 
contemplation is possible without consent to the world as a whole... [even when] granted 
amid tears and the extremes of horror.”64 Pieper affirms that despite the circumstances of 
the world, not only the act of happiness (contemplation) but also “the object of that act, 
that drink called happiness” is available on earth.  
It is worth emphasizing that while happiness must be achieved through the act of 
contemplation, it is not earned but only ever granted as a gift.65 Pieper makes the 
distinction that human striving can attain eudaimonia, that is, the possession of goods and 
 
61 Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation. 88. 
62 Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation. 77. 
63 Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation.78. 
64 Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation. 106. 





wealth, but makarios, man's participation in the blessedness of the gods, is beyond our 
ability to acquire.66 “No one can obtain felicity by pursuit... we cannot make ourselves 
happy.”67 Without divine assistance, the search for happiness is a “blind seeking” for 
something which we cannot properly identify or understand how to obtain.68 
Nevertheless, Pieper argues that earthly happiness is within the reach of each person. This 
happiness is a gift, but there are actions that can be taken to prepare to receive the gift. 
These actions are the virtues.  
ACTING IN RESPONSE TO CREATEDNESS 
Pieper’s essays on practical virtue are written from the perspective of being ‘on-
the-way,’ status viatoris, seeking the beatific vision. There are three actions that dominate 
Pieper’s work in relation to the end: pursuing the end through virtuous acts; resting in the 
end or a foretaste of the end through leisure and contemplation; and celebrating the 
attainment or partial attainment of the end through festivity. (Only the first of these 
actions is typically addressed in works on the virtues, but for Pieper, leisure and festivity 
are the marks of a virtuous society.) Each of these actions is made possible because of the 
recognition that the world is good, springing from what Berthold Wald calls a 
“theologically founded worldliness,” which is a term also used in certain of Pieper’s 
essays to describe Aquinas’ project of accepting the good in Aristotelian philosophy.  
Pieper’s essays offer suggestions for how to think about the meaning of the 
Christian virtues. The seven virtues, leisure, and festivity are proposed as a corrective to 
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modernity, which in rejecting the ideas of creation from nonexistence, the goodness of 
created existence, and the existence of the Creator from whom the world emerges, also 
rejects the Christian vision of the well-lived life.69 In brief, Pieper’s idea of virtue can be 
summarized as follows. Because of the createdness of humanity, there are ways in which 
it is proper to the nature of the person to act; this is virtue. As a philosopher who relies 
heavily on Aristotle and Plato, Pieper acknowledges the ability of those outside the 
church to practice the natural virtues. However, virtue can only be present to its highest 
degree in the Christian who has access through baptism to grace unavailable to those 
outside the church.  
The goodness of creation pervades Pieper’s treatment of the virtues. Pieper 
adopted Aquinas’ summary of a fundamental theme within revelation, “Everything 
created by God is good.”70 Starting, then, from the goodness of creation, Pieper makes 
human nature a central part of his arguments in each of the virtues. Pieper insists that the 
practice of virtuous living is a human practice. The human person is not a good spirit 
attached to an evil body which corrupts the soul, but human body-and-soul. Therefore, 
virtue regulates both the body and the soul, and in fact an act is virtuous only when both 
body and soul are rightly ordered. Furthermore, as Meilaender notes, for Pieper the 
virtues require possession of the other virtues, since no action can be virtuous when 
directed toward a bad end.71 Because the virtuous life is a unity, this entails the practice 
of all the virtues. However, the virtue of prudence is especially important because it is by 
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prudence that a person is able to perceive the createdness of the world.72 Thus, in the 
treatment of the virtues below, while the separate essays are treated individually this is in 
some ways an artificial division. Certain of Pieper’s works are written to illuminate how 
a share in beatitude is possible in this life—this idea is addressed in Leisure, the Basis of 
Culture and In Tune with the World: A Theory of Festivity.73 Leisure and Festivity address 
the kinds of false rest and false worship the contemporary societies practice, as well as 
defining what true worship and true rest are. To seek the wrong kind of happiness by 
misidentifying the good will, over time, not only fail to satisfy but also will distort the 
will and pull the seeker of happiness further from God.  
Pieper devotes several works to these ideas because he contends that “it is 
peculiar to our time that we may conceive of festivity itself as being expressly 
repudiated.”74 Pieper notes that both happiness and contemplation “demand eternity;” 
that is, they put us in contact with what eternity is like because we can 'stand' to be happy 
for a long time. We are “capable of remaining longer without fatigue or distraction than in 
any other activity.”75 In contrast, contemporary societies flatten reality to deny the 
supernatural dimension which is necessary for happiness. In A Theory of Festivity, Pieper 
acknowledges that other societies throughout history have also lacked the ability to 
achieve festivity. In particular, he references the Baroque period in European history, and 
acknowledges that some the ancient Greeks sometimes found their own festivals “empty 
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and wearisome pomp.”76 The question of festival is an eternal problem intensified by the 
radically anti-human world of modern work which confronted Pieper. Just as the Church 
has historically defined dogma in response to the challenge of heresy, Pieper sets himself 
the task of explicitly defining festivity and leisure in order to defend them. In the process, 
he relates the two concepts to the virtues and outlines a theory of their practice in a 
rightly ordered human society.  
Most briefly stated, leisure is a rest in the contemplation of God, while festival is a 
celebration of the good. Leisure often takes place in silence or alone, while a festival 
necessarily takes place in a social context. (One can have a festive attitude when alone, 
although perhaps it makes more sense to say that one may participate in the celebration of 
a feast alone.) The primary aspect of leisure is contemplation and openness to created 
reality. When leisure overflows into celebration, it is called festivity. Each includes the 
other, yet it makes sense to talk about them as individual phenomena because while 
festival is an aspect of leisure, leisure is not exclusively festive. And a festival contains 
other elements than leisure alone—most importantly worship, but also acted expression 
of celebration, which have a special significance of their own. An essential element of 
festivity is an abundance of joy, although that joy may be expressed as sorrow over the 
absence of a joy. On the other hand, leisure is frequently something other than pure 
worship or the creation of art, though those two elements may also be found in leisure. 
Festivity also has a necessarily communal aspect which is not necessary for leisure. 
These two concepts will be addressed in much more depth in the final chapter. The most 
 





crucial distinction is that festivity in its most intense form is leisure. Two other concepts 
which are important (and have already been discussed) are contemplation and ultimate 
happiness. The chart below summarizes the relationships between these four primary 
concepts in Pieper’s writing: 
 
Figure 1: Relationships between core concepts in Pieper.  Figure created by the author. 
  
 
Leisure leads to contemplation and contemplation is an aspect of leisure. Festival is an 
element of leisure. Leisure makes possible fullest happiness. A festival directly expresses 
a community’s approach to fullest happiness. Contemplation is identical to ultimate 
happiness. And finally, though not reflected on this diagram, both contemplation and 
fullest happiness are acts in the sense that they are actions of the intellectus as the person 
strives to take exterior reality into the interior of the person.  
Only when a person acknowledges the exterior world as created can it be 





reliable perception of the real world through the senses can there be a possibility for real 
cognition of the world. Human desire seeks fulfillment in created reality but is ultimately 
satisfied by union with God in contemplation. Contemplation of God is most perfectly 
fulfilled in the life which comes to the person after death, but it is also possible on earth 
through actions the human person takes. Without perception of the real world, there is no 
possibility for human happiness on earth. Pieper relies on these concepts in order to 
structure many of his works, but especially his works on the virtuous life, which will be 
addressed at the end of this essay. In certain cases, Pieper does not go into detail about 
the specifics of his proposals for the virtuous life, but that is not his intent: Pieper strives 
to provide a philosophical grounding for certain intuitions about the disorder of modern 
life. However, before addressing Pieper, it is useful to turn to Aquinas in order to 
understand the context for Pieper’s essays. As will be discussed, Aquinas was a 
particularly important influence on the shape of Pieper’s works, and Aquinas’ work on 














AQUINAS ON ASSENT, PERCEPTION, AND END 
In 1924, a lecture by Romano Guardini on the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas 
inspired an intuition which served as the thesis for Pieper's doctoral dissertation and 
continued to influence Pieper's philosophy for the rest of his life. As he expresses it in his 
autobiography, this intuition was that: 
“Every ought is grounded in an is; the good is what corresponds to reality. 
If anyone wants to know and do good, he must direct his gaze to the 
objective world of being; not to his own mind, not to his own conscience, 
not to values, nor to ideals or paradigms he has himself drawn up. He must 
look away from his own act and toward reality.”1 
 
This orientation toward “objective reality” as the precondition for knowledge of the good 
was Pieper’s basis for reading Aquinas.2 Pieper’s reliance on Aquinas’ metaphysics of 
creation has been recognized as crucial to understand Pieper’s work by Bernard 
Schumacher. 3 This holds true where Pieper cites Aquinas extensively for support, such as 
Happiness and Contemplation, as well as when Aquinas is cited only rarely, for example 
in Pieper’s In Tune with the World: A Theory of Festivity or in his many works intended 
for non-specialists. But before looking at the specific contexts where Pieper references 
these ideas, it is first necessary to review Thomas Aquinas' metaphysics of creation, 
theory of knowledge, and perception of reality.  
Pieper cites Aquinas as an example of the wisdom of humanity as expressed in the 
Catholic Church, but by no means the only source of wisdom: “[h]e is intended as the 
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witness for that tradition.”4 Pieper came to this tradition by an unusual route. While 
theologians in Pieper’s time would have been very familiar with Aquinas, Pieper was not 
trained as a theologian. As an undergraduate, Pieper studied law and philosophy; 
moreover, his philosophy advisor concentrated his own work in animal psychology.5 In 
consequence, Pieper’s study of Aquinas, though influenced by teachers such as a former 
Dominican at his secondary school, Erich Przywara, and Romano Guardini, was self-
motivated and largely took place outside his formal university education, until he decided 
to write his doctoral thesis on Aquinas.6   
Pieper received significant training in the works of Aquinas under Erich Przywara 
during summer college courses over a period of three years.7 Przywara also taught 
notable twentieth century theologians including Hans Urs Von Balthasar, Edith Stein, and 
others.8 Przywara’s Thomism emphasized Aquinas’ work on the distinction between 
essence and existence, his theologia negativa, and is characterized by a “method of 
immanent historical understanding that aimed at an objective synthesis,” as he describes. 
Przywara opposed this method to contemporary neo-scholastics and neo-Thomists, 
particularly those heavily influenced by the tradition of manuals and commentaries.9 
Przywara was interested in conversation with modern philosophies like idealism and 
existentialism, but refused to distort Thomism to be palatable to those philosophies; nor, 
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however, would he keep Aquinas from any contact with modern philosophy.10  
Following Erich Przywara, who similarly “was never a pure neo-scholastic”11 
Pieper engaged in dialogue with contemporary philosophers insofar as he thought they 
provided insight into what is true. Pieper’s criticisms of Thomists seem directed 
sometimes at neo-scholastics and rigid neo-Thomists, though he also cites commentaries 
including Suarez and Cajetan. At other times his criticisms seem to be directed at the 
Transcendental Thomists,12 who sought to answer questions posed by Kantian 
metaphysics with reference to Aquinas. While O’Meara argues that the Transcendental 
Thomists did not “mix or compromise Aquinas with Kant,”13 Pieper describes their 
project in a decidedly negative tone as one which “refers back to him [Aquinas] and 
claims to bring his doctrine up to date.”14 Pieper’s reading of Aquinas was much more 
influenced by historical-theological readings of Aquinas, including Etienne Gilson, 
Marie-Dominique Chenu, and Fernand van Steenberghen, all of whom he appreciates 
because of their “determination… to go beyond mere scholarliness and to ask and answer 
the question of the truth of things.”15 Pieper did however dialogue with Kantian 
metaphysics, as an instance of his disagreement with modern philosophy.  
Because Pieper’s corpus is so large and because he published extensively on 
Thomas, this chapter concentrates on the concepts within Aquinas which Pieper refers to 
the most frequently: the world’s createdness and its relationship to the Creator; and the 
 
10 Thomas F. O'Meara O.P., Thomas Aquinas Theologian (Notre Dame, IN: UND Press, 1997). 186. 
11 Betz, "Translator's Preface." 14. 
12 Gerald A. McCool, "Neo-Thomism and the Tradition of St. Thomas," Article, Thought 62, no. 245 
(1987). 
13 O'Meara O.P., Thomas Aquinas Theologian. 188. 
14 Pieper, Guide to Thomas Aquinas. 105. 





fact that goodness is rooted in external, objective reality.16 Pieper explicitly identifies 
these themes as important to understanding Aquinas’ philosophy, and frequently returns 
to them. Although not explicitly stated by Pieper in reference to his own work, I argue 
that they are also crucial for understanding Pieper. By entering more fully into the themes 
discussed above in their original context, Aquinas’ thought will provide context for 
Pieper’s application of them in his works of practical moral philosophy.  
AQUINAS ON CREATION AND BEING 
As discussed in the first chapter, Aquinas argues that God accounts for the 
existence of reality.17 Not only does God have the power to create, “we must hold firmly 
that God can and does make things from nothing” (emphasis added.)18  Finally, God has 
created everything that exists.19 While other spirits, angels, and creatures with material 
bodies have the power to re-arrange matter and generate new life through natural 
processes, this is not true creation. For Pieper, this is key to understanding the work of 
Aquinas. Not only is it true that “nothing exists which is not creatura, except the Creator 
Himself,” it is also the case that “this createdness determines entirely and all-pervasively 
the inner structure of the creature.”20  For example, Aquinas notes that it is not possible to 
understand the “being which is in creatures… except as derived from the divine being.”21  
The concept of “being” in Aquinas necessarily requires assent to several 
 
16 For the fullest presentation of Pieper’s thoughts on these ideas, see his works Reality and the Good and 
The Truth of All Thing, usually together published in the United States as Living the Truth.   
17 Brian Davies, Thomas Aquinas's Summa Contra Gentiles: A Guide and Commentary (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2016). 55. 
18 Thomas Aquinas, "Disputed Questions on the Power of God," ed. Fathers of the English Dominican 
Province (Intellex Past Masters Database). 3, 1. 
19 Aquinas, "On the Power of God." 3, 4. 
20 Pieper, "Negative Philosophy." 47. 





interrelated propositions about the nature of creation, creatures, and God. For example, 
Aquinas argues that since all things have an essence or nature, this necessarily implies 
that they were created.22 Yet this assumes a number of points—the existence of God 
being foremost among them, but also that things have a nature at all, something which is 
not at all obvious to the contemporary world. So, in order to understand this very 
different picture of the world which has relevance both to understanding Aquinas as well 
as Pieper’s work, the relationship of creation to God in Aquinas’ Disputed Questions on 
the Power of God will be examined. Createdness, the quality creaturae have of existing as 
created, is addressed at length in On the Power of God because God’s relationship to the 
universe He creates and sustains in being is of primary concern when considering God’s 
power.  
In “On the Preservation of Things by God” in On the Power of God Aquinas 
affirms that God has power over everything but emphasizes that God also respects the 
essential natures of created things. God creates and holds everything in existence, and if 
that action of creating and holding ever ceased, everything would return to the state of 
nothing from which it was created.23 Although God has the power to annihilate, Aquinas 
argues that since God “fashioned each nature in such a way as not to deprive it of its 
property” he will not cease to uphold any creatura whose nature is to endure—although 
not everything is intended to last forever.24 In a beautiful passage, Aquinas suggests that 
the purpose for which the stars move is the filling of the kingdom of God, and when they 
 
22 Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation. 61. 
23 Aquinas, "On the Power of God." 5, 1. 





have reached that end, the heavens will come to rest. Yet it is simultaneously true that the 
universe “exists for the sake of existing, wherein it is like God”—it has an inherent 
dignity to itself. Its integrity as creatura is respected, even while it is subject to God’s 
will.25 In a discussion about the final destination of the elements of the universe, Aquinas 
argues that they will be transformed: “the elements will remain in their substance and 
natural qualities.” Though their movement and “corruption” will cease, their essential 
qualities will be preserved.26 In all of these parts of the created world, God preserves their 
natures as he has created them. Each of the parts of creation considered fulfill their role in 
the universe by “[existing] for the sake of existing,” and each individual creatura acts 
according to its end.27 
Aquinas draws these threads together in the final article of the question which 
considers the fate of the human body. Unlike the other parts of the material world 
Aquinas considers, human beings are composed of both material body and immaterial 
rational soul. Aquinas argues against those who posit that the body will pass away and the 
soul alone will be united to God.28 Aquinas states that since Christ “never did and never 
will put aside the body which once for all he reassumed in his resurrection” neither will 
the saints, after the resurrection of the body, put aside their corporeal bodies.29 Aquinas 
presents two reasons to support this argument: first, because it is human nature to be both 
spirit and body. If the body passed away, the person would no longer be in accordance 
with God’s design for the perfected human. The human body is not “accidental” to the 
 
25 Aquinas, "On the Power of God." 5, 5. 
26 Aquinas, "On the Power of God." 5, 7. 
27 Aquinas, "On the Power of God." 5, 5. 
28 Aquinas, "On the Power of God." 5, 10, obj. 3; obj. 5. 





person, but an essential element of the person.30 The second reason follows from the 
preceding articles of the question, which can be distilled to asking what in creation will 
remain when the world is transformed. Everything will be radically changed, and some of 
the parts of the universe will be ended. But everything in the universe, even including the 
elements, will be preserved and raised up to fulfill its potential by the redemption of the 
human soul and God’s redemption of the restored body. “By its perfect union with God 
the soul will have complete sway over the body: so that although matter, if left to itself, is 
corruptible, it will acquire incorruption by the power of the soul.”31 Humanity, as created, 
is subject to how it has been created to be by nature. Aquinas believes that as such, God 
affirms human nature by redeeming and fulfilling it, not changing it.  
It is important to note in the preceding discussion that, both for the created world 
in general and human beings specifically, God preserves and affirms the natures of what 
He has made. For Pieper, Aquinas' affirmation of the goodness of creation is intended to 
emphasize that “created things are good because they were created by God... [including] 
the reality of creation in man... [and] all the powers of his being.”32 Pieper argued that 
this affirmation of creation stems from Aquinas' “reverence for the reality of the 
Incarnation of God.”33 Practically, this requires assent to createdness by each person, 
because by rejecting createdness, one rejects the fundamentally good character of God. 
Instead, affirmation of created things should result in love of what God has created. Love 
is, in part, an act of the will, because “to confirm and affirm something that is already 
 
30 Aquinas, "On the Power of God." 5, 10, resp. 
31 Aquinas, "On the Power of God." 5, 10, resp.; ad 3. 
32 Pieper, "On Thomas Aquinas." 33. 





accomplished” is an act of the will.34 The affirmation of being, acknowledging that 
existence is good, is the first principle upon all reason is based. Affirming or “assenting” 
to existence itself is necessary to real perception of reality.35  This assent to human 
createdness, creation, and the Creator must be given in order to encounter the world. 
AQUINAS ON PERCEPTION OF REALITY 
There are two necessary conditions to be met in order to be able to perceive 
reality. First, the perceiving subject must have the capacity to perceive in general. How 
does Aquinas know that humanity can perceive the world? Returning to the concept of 
human createdness as discussed above, Aquinas believed that humans are endowed by 
God with a nature that has the power to perceive created things. Against the Augustinians, 
who claimed that spiritual knowledge was not related to the use of the senses, Aquinas 
affirmed that all knowledge is “somehow dependent upon sense perception.”36 Perception 
of reality through the senses is what allows us to form universal ideas or concepts within 
our intellect.37 Our intellects take sense impressions and abstract them into immaterial 
forms which can be understood by the mind, and then acted upon.38 Second, the 
perceived object must exist. As Davies discusses in reference to the second book of the 
Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas opposed those who doubted the existence of the 
external world assuming “that it is obvious that we live among physical things that act on 
us as we act upon them.”39 
 
34 Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues. 165. 
35 Aquinas, "ST." I.II, 94, 2. 
36 Pieper, "On Thomas Aquinas." 29. 
37 Aquinas, "ST." I, 78, 4 ad. 5. 
38 Aquinas, "ST." I, 84, 2. 





The mode of perception used by human persons is the reason,40 which for Aquinas 
includes both ratio and intellectus.41 Ratio is discursive reasoning, or the ability to 
connect premises, things, or concepts; sometimes this entails the use of logic, but not 
necessarily in the formal sense. Ratio is the part of the reason which examines things 
presented to the senses and creates a likeness of those things in order that they can be 
understood by the human mind. Intellectus is the form of reason which intuitively 
perceives reality or imagines what could be. It is passive in the technical sense used by 
Aquinas because it operates by moving from the potential to understand to actual 
understanding without effort.42 The intellectus is receptive to sense impressions, and it is 
the form of reason which understands first principles. First principles are directly 
understood by the intellectus. This is unlike ratio which actively strives to move, 
sometimes painfully, from one idea to one which can be connected to that first idea in 
some way. The ratio constructs ideas about the world through a process of discursive 
reasoning. These two parts of reason are part of “the same” reason, but act in different 
ways upon the same objects.43 It is the intellectus which contemplates. 
While these two elements of the reason relate to the world in different ways, each 
depends on the correct operation of the other. If the senses are impaired due to the heat of 
 
40 Human reason is unique to humanity. It is superior to the “cognitive power” possessed by animals, which 
can only comprehend individual objects. Animals do not possess a ratio; although they are able to perform 
some of the same operations we do, they operate according to instinct, not human reason (Aquinas, "SCG." 
2, 201-2.) Similarly, Aquinas notes that angels, having no body, directly perceive reality in a different 
manner than humans do.  (Aquinas, "ST." I, 85, 1.) 
41 Ratio and intellectus are translated using different terms by different authors. In general, ratio will be 
discussed using the term “discursive reasoning” while intellectus is discussed using “contemplation” or 
“intuitive perception.” The power of the mind to think in general will be referred to as “reason.” The 
translation of Aquinas used for the Past Masters Database typically uses “reason” to refer to ratio and 
“understanding” to indicate intellectus.  
42 Aquinas, "ST." I, 79, 3.  





anger, the operation of the ratio is hindered—it is not as easy to logically discuss one’s 
obligation to a group after suffering harm from them. Yet so is the intellectus, which 
depends on the ratio to reason from direct perception to new ideas.44 Insofar as a person 
wilfully refuses to practice temperance, the hindrance of the reason may be attributable to 
a sin like lust or gluttony.45 The ratio, on the other hand, depends for its ability to reason 
upon certain principles which can only be learned through direct illumination of the 
mind. An example of a foundational principle is the principle of non-contradiction, that a 
thing cannot be itself and not itself. Though Aquinas admits the possibility that the senses 
may sometimes be impaired by the body, he assumes that it is generally possible to know 
the world through sense impression.46  
Human perception relies on the existence of God who created people able to 
perceive: “a natural thing is placed between two knowing subjects”—knowing subjects 
being the knowing person and God.47 Josef Pieper found Aquinas’ discussion of this 
double relationship of knowledge in On Truth important enough to return to in multiple 
works, so it is worth spending time to consider it. In the first question of On Truth, two 
kinds of truth are considered, truth as it exists in a thing and truth as it exists in the mind. 
For human persons, truth is in the intellect as the intellect judges the conformity of a 
mind’s idea of an object to the object itself.48 The standard for truth is the created object; 
whether the idea in the mind conforms to that object determines whether truth is in the 
intellect. However, the same thing is given shape by its Creator, God. In relation to God, 
 
44 Aquinas, "ST." I.II, 47, 3; I, 76, 3. 
45 Aquinas, "ST." II.II, 15, 2 
46 Aquinas, "ST." I.II, 28, 5. 
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“these things are themselves measured” and a given creatura can be called true if it 
“fulfills the end to which it was ordained by the divine intellect.”49 In this way, a given 
thing is “placed between two knowing subjects,” one of which it measures and by Whom 
it is measured.  
God knows individual created things directly,50 but the human mind is only able to 
know God through the knowledge of created things:  
“…all different things imitate God in different ways; and, according to 
different forms, they represent the one simple form of God, since in His 
form are found perfectly united all the perfections that are found, distinct 
and multiple, among creatures.”51  
 
The light which enables our minds to know individual things is the divine light.52 This 
divine light is a gift; being created to perceive is a gift; the perceivability of created 
things is a gift. Every aspect of our ability to know and be known is a divine gift.53  
Because God sustains and creates the world through His thought, humans can 
know.54 As explained above, God’s sustaining of the world takes place through a creative 
thought which summons the world into and upholds the world’s continued existence. 
Creatura “cannot exist except by reason of the divine intellect which keeps bringing them 
into being.”55 We are able to know the truth of things “secondarily” rather than primarily. 
God is the cause of truth in creatura; in contrast, truth is an “effect” of the human 
intellect’s perception of a thing “in the sense that the latter receives its knowledge from 
 
49 Aquinas, "On Truth." 1, 2, resp. 
50 Aquinas, "On Truth." 2, 5.  
51 Aquinas, "On Truth." 2, 1. 
52 Aquinas, "On Truth." 1, 4, s.c.; 6, 1. 
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things.”56 It is important to note, however, that creatura can be known because we are 
able to “receive knowledge” from them. This quality of ‘self-revelation’ is found in any 
created thing: “in the degree in which a thing has being, in that degree it is capable of 
being proportioned to intellect.”57 What this means is that anything that exists can be 
understood, to some degree, by the human mind. The ability to be understood is a 
property of existence itself.   
Our perception of reality is limited not by reality's unknowability but by the 
human incapacity to comprehend all of God: “we cannot give God a name that defines or 
includes or equals his essence: since we do not know to that extent what God 
is.”58Aquinas notes that human knowledge about God is highly circumscribed; through 
reason, we can only know what God is not, not what he is.59 God creates and measures all 
things; God is not given measure by anything because this would put God in a lesser 
position to His measurer. Schumacher summarizes Pieper’s position that Aquinas’ 
metaphysics of creation necessarily entails an “impossibility of arriving at a final 
understanding of anything” because the essential natures of each creatura come from their 
being creatively thought by God, who alone can fully comprehend the essence of each 
thing.60 Each being’s essence was created by God, who is not able to be known by the 
finite human mind. To a lesser extent, the essence of each created thing expresses that 
same unknowability. Created and shaped by an infinite God, were a thing to be totally 
knowable to the created person it would no longer partake even in some small way of the 
 
56 Aquinas, "On Truth." 1, 4, resp. 
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58 Aquinas, "On the Power of God." 7, 5 ad 6. 
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vastness of God. Yet although God is infinitely greater than the human mind can grasp, it 
is also true that “our intellect is led… to the divine knowledge so as to know about God 
that He is, and other such truths….”61 To look intently at reality is to realize the extent of 
the mystery which confronts us. 
To summarize, human perception takes place through the working of the reason, 
which is given to humans as a capacity within human nature. Among the capacities of 
creaturae in general is to both give measure (to the human intellect) and to be measured 
(by the divine intellect). Human knowledge is measured by God and by the created 
world; the only category of things that humans measure is things that have been invented 
or made by people.62 Truth “resides, in its primary aspect, in the intellect… truth is 
defined by the conformity of intellect and thing; and hence to know this conformity is to 
know truth.”63 For a human person to accurately perceive the world requires that the 
ideas about the world present in their intellect be conformed to reality which has been 
created by God. 
AQUINAS ON THE HIGHEST GOOD AND ULTIMATE END   
For Aquinas, the ultimate end of human life, the only thing which can satisfy 
human desire, is union with God. There is nothing else which can fulfill the human desire 
for happiness. Aquinas argues that this is because God, the “source and goal” of human 
life, has created human nature to find “fulfillment, but not replacement or rejection” in 
the final union with Himself which is—as noted above—human destiny.64 This is the end 
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for which all human striving seeks. It is helpful, however, to dwell more closely on a few 
themes which come up in Pieper’s works on the moral life, specifically how the person 
achieves this union with God. It is the mind, the means by which a person comprehends 
reality, which is the means the person uses to seek the good. Furthermore, it is an act of 
the intellect by which good is taken into the person. What is the good for which the 
person should seek? That one thing that will produce “final and perfect happiness”: 
“nothing else than the vision of the Divine Essence” Aquinas says, “… thus it will have 
its perfection through union with God.”65 
 Western philosophy of mind, including Aquinas, has historically taught that it is 
not possible to separate human nature from the mind and that the will is a part of the 
created soul.66 In humans, “the one principle and root of all [willing] is love.”67 Love of 
some good is the motivation for every action. Every act of the will is oriented toward 
some good, because every act of the will is motivated by love of some good whether 
positively (a desire to seek it out) or negatively (a desire to avoid it). “For nobody desires 
anything nor rejoices in anything, except as a good that is loved…”68 As the person seeks 
good in the world, reality is “simply” perceived by the intellectus. In addition, the: 
“‘good’ is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the 
practical reason, which is directed to action: since every agent acts for 
an end under the aspect of good. Consequently, the first principle of 
practical reason is one founded on the notion of good, viz. that "good is 
that which all things seek after.”69 
 
65 Aquinas, "ST." I.II 3, 8. As noted in the first chapter, this identification of the end of human life as 
beatitude is distinct from contemporary virtue ethics, which argues for eudaimonia as the end of human life. 
66 Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation. 22. 
67 Aquinas, "SCG." IV, 19. 
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Thus, the mind naturally moves from a passive perception of “what reality is” to an active 
attempt to identify what is good in reality and a striving to obtain what is desired by the 
will—the good. 
 “The essence of happiness consists in an act of the intellect.”70 Pieper comments 
that for Aquinas, the most perfect satisfaction of human longing  
“takes place in the manner in which we become aware of reality; the whole 
energy of our being is ultimately directed toward attainment of insight. 
The perfectly happy person...is one who sees.”71  
 
Aquinas does not allow for exceptions; any happiness that any person experiences is an 
act of the intellect, as the object of happiness is brought into the person through the 
operation of the intellect. Knowledge precedes the movement of the will in loving, 
because one must perceive what is loved before the will can be inclined toward it.72 One 
objection to this picture of happiness considered by Aquinas is that happiness is “he who 
has whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss.”73 Aquinas acknowledges this to be a 
condition for happiness but he argues that while a happy person is satisfied when she has 
what she desires, “having, however, takes place by something other than an act of will.”74 
As Pieper summarizes it: “having” or “possession of the beloved... takes place in an act 
of cognition, in seeing, in intuition, in contemplation.”75  
 By happiness, Aquinas means the happiness which, having been attained, is so 
 
70 Aquinas, "ST." I.II 3, 4. See Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation. 58. 
71 Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation. 58. 
72 Aquinas, "ST." I.II 3, 4 ad. 4.  
73 Aquinas, "ST." I.II 3, 4 obj. 4. 
74 Aquinas, "ST."  I.II 3, 4 ad 5. See also Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation. 62. 





satisfying that a person cannot desire anything else. The desire of the will for happiness is 
infinite; there is no end to the appetite for diversion.76 Nothing created can satisfy the 
desire for happiness, because the soul is by nature is formed so that it can take in the 
entire universe. Yet if nothing can satisfy the desire for happiness, was humanity created 
to suffer without satisfaction of this desire for the good? Aquinas answers by stating that 
nothing suffices to satisfy the will of man other than the “whole of all goodness”, which 
is not able to be found in any individual created thing or even every created thing; the 
person is only able to find it in God, because the goodness of God surpasses all else.77  
 Aquinas argues that the “vision of the Divine Essence” is the source of 
happiness.78 As noted in the first chapter, contemplation of God can seem like a cold 
substitute for whatever one conceives happiness to be, but Aquinas notes that happiness 
includes emotions. Thus, according to Aquinas, it is possible to find perfect emotional 
happiness in God.79 It is human nature for a person to love God more than anything else, 
including her own self. While God, who created the human will to desire happiness, is the 
ultimate source of that desire, the will nonetheless desires happiness freely.80 Note, 
though, the difference between human nature and what each person does. While many 
people do love themselves more than God, because “God is the universal good” and good 
is what is eternally sought by the will, to love anything more than God is to work against 
human nature.81 For Aquinas, by knowing and contemplating God, our mind is oriented 
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toward the source of happiness and our will’s desire for happiness is satisfied. 
 Pieper's identification of the centrality of Aquinas' metaphysics of creation to 
Aquinas' work resulted in a frequent return to the view of the world as “created” within 
Pieper's own writing. His  argument that the human desire for happiness can only be 
fulfilled by contact with something outside ourselves which surpasses our ability to 
master it becomes easier to understand by reading Aquinas, who notes that the human 
person is created to be fulfilled in union with God. Aquinas’ insistence that God preserves 
and affirms the natures of what He has created is the reason for the high regard in which 
Pieper holds created reality. Createdness is also relevant to understanding Aquinas’ theory 
of perception. Pieper relies on the double relationship between the human mind and the 
Divine mind for confidence that the human reason operates accurately.  Pieper agrees 
with Aquinas that without assenting to the existence of the Creator, it is impossible to be 
confident that the human mind truly is perceiving what exists in the world. To understand 
Pieper, one must recall his adherence to Aquinas’ answer to what can satisfy the human 
desire for happiness. Only union with God is the destination and fulfillment of human 
life, and the goal of the moral life is to live in such a way that union with God can be 
attained. Having discussed Pieper’s approach to the three concepts discussed—assent to 
createdness, perception of reality, and the final end of human life—and having surveyed 
some of Aquinas’ thoughts on these topics, the main section of this thesis will analyze 
select works of Pieper’s moral philosophy, in which he discusses living the humane life, 
through the lens of these ideas. Without this understanding of Aquinas’ work on 






CHAPTER 4:  
CREATEDNESS IN PIEPER’S WORKS ON THE VIRTUES, LEISURE, AND REST 
In Pieper’s seven essays on the virtues, Leisure, the Basis of Culture, and In Tune 
with the World: A Theory of Festivity, Pieper uses the concepts of assent to createdness, 
perception of reality, and pursuit of the end of human life to affirm the necessity of 
specific practices. These practices include the seven virtues, as well as other activities 
which lead to rest and celebration. For Pieper, human virtues are neither abstract concepts 
nor emotions, nor attitudes, but specific practices necessarily embodied and concretely 
acted in a manner that accords with human nature and leads to the end of human life. In 
the preface to The Four Cardinal Virtues, Pieper states that “the doctrine of virtue... 
speaks both of the kind of being which is his when he enters the world, as a consequence 
of his createdness, and the kind of being he ought to strive toward and attain to—by 
being prudent, just, brave, and temperate.”1  
Though not always discussed in the language used above, the three themes under 
consideration help the reader understand Pieper’s moral philosophy, so there is value in 
identifying how these themes are present in specific works. The goal of this analysis is 
not to explicitly identify instances where Pieper uses the language of this framework—as 
the framework is not Pieper’s, but the author’s—but to demonstrate how the ideas 
underlying the framework are expressed in Pieper’s idea of the virtuous life. I argue that 
this is the case in both Pieper’s essays on the seven virtues as well as two of his works 
which are not generally grouped with the virtues: Leisure, the Basis of Culture and A 
 





Theory of Festivity. The latter two work are especially significant to this analysis because 
they present a more holistic picture of the ideal human life, rather than isolating a virtue 
from the kind of life to which it ought to lead. 
THE CARDINAL VIRTUES 
Pieper’s moral philosophy prioritized the practice of the virtues because he saw it 
as freer than a moral philosophy more concerned with “commandments or duties” than an 
orientation toward the end of human existence.2 As noted above, Pieper began his 
university studies in the faculty of theology but quickly moved to philosophy; he thus 
would probably have had some limited experience with the German 20th century 
manualists such as those discussed by Keenan.3 Pieper primarily read philosophers in 
addition to patristic and scholastic theologians, rather than casuists or manualists, the 
latter of whom were the primary source of moral theology at the beginning of the 
twentieth century.4 Pieper’s moral philosophy was also shaped by the debates on the 
“sources of Christian ethics” occurring in Germany in the first three decades of the 
twentieth century.5 Lottin critiques the manualists and, like Pieper, notes Aquinas’ 
identification of the centrality of prudence in ethics and advocates for a turn to the 
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“person” in ethical reflection.6 Pieper also has some similarity to Bernard Häring’s early 
work.7 Pieper follows the division of the virtues into the natural, or cardinal virtues, 
which Pieper argues can be somewhat attained by the non-Christian person; and the 
theological virtues, which are infused into the human soul by supernatural grace. Despite 
his interest in theology, Pieper writes as a philosopher when—although he acknowledges 
that some contemporary theologians had criticized the system of the virtues which he 
uses as “too philosophical and not scriptural enough”—he defends his use of the 
traditional list of the seven virtues because of its awareness of human “createdness.”8 
Pieper’s works on the virtues reflect on properly human action, actions that accord 
with human nature, in an imperfect world. His essays reviewed in this section were 
written over a span of thirty-eight years, and consequently vary in style, maturity, and 
focus.9 Although Pieper did not begin On Fortitude intending to write on each of the 
virtues systematically, by the publication of On Love in 1972 common themes can be 
discerned in the essays. Pieper’s essays situate the created person in the world, which is 
especially important to understanding temperance. Temperance directs a person to choose 
the amount of a good which will preserve peace within a person. Acknowledgment of our 
createdness is related to our journey to God, an important aspect of faith. Perception of 
reality is especially discussed in the context of prudence, justice, and love. Justice is the 
virtue that directs the person to choose the good owed to another person in order to 
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restore an external order of peace. Fortitude directs a person to choose a great good 
despite difficulty. The pursuit of the good and knowledge of our end in God is especially 
important to the practice of fortitude as well as hope, both of which stem from desire for 
happiness and a rejection of everything not oriented toward the good. For Pieper, the 
practice of each of the virtues depends on understanding and pursuing the final end of 
human existence—contemplation of and unity with God. 
 Following Aquinas, Pieper argues that prudence is the crown of the virtues 
because it is “the cause of other virtues’ being virtues at all.”10 Prudence is “a habit of 
choosing, i.e. making us choose well” and choosing the good is necessary for the practice 
of any other virtue.11 If a person cannot perceive the good, even actions which appear 
virtuous will not be virtuous actions; to risk danger to kill an innocent person is not a 
virtuous action.12 The virtue of prudence is the habit of perceiving reality in order to 
identify which concrete act should be taken to pursue the good. Prudence primarily 
relates to two aspects of being created: the perception of reality and the identification of 
the good as it is present in a specific circumstance. The aspect of prudence which Pieper 
argues is crucial to understand the virtue is its ability to aid a person’s perception of 
reality. Prudence is “the perfected ability to make right decisions.”13 In the context of 
prudence, the ‘realization of the good’ is achieved by performing the actions that accord 
with what is “appropriate to the real situation.” Without clear perception of reality, or 
contact with the “objective world of being,” it is impossible to act in accordance with 
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what is real.14 Prudence operates using the reason which observes and is measured by 
reality outside the person. Prudence receives the “revelation of reality” through the 
intellectus and operates to judge whether an action is in accordance with the good that is 
held in the mind. To be prudent, a person must be oriented toward reality.  
 Although knowledge of ultimate goodness is necessary to practice prudence in its 
highest form, prudence on a practical level is primarily concerned with making sure “the 
means to the end” is good.15 The prudent action can only be determined within the 
context of actual situations, and only the person involved can decide what the truly 
prudent action is.16 In his essay on fortitude, Pieper distinguishes prudence from the 
modern “slyness” or “discretion” which is “conjured up by the coward to… be able to 
shirk the test.”17 This is an important point because in Pieper’s moral calculus, any unjust 
action, lie, or other sin is imprudent as well as a failure to practice another virtue; this 
accords with Pieper’s understanding of the unity of the virtues. Obstacles to prudence 
include thoughtless actions, hesitation, and irresoluteness.18 A person can also fail to act 
prudently when their action is directed toward imperfect ends, or regard “tactics” as more 
important than goodness.19 Prudence militates against an ethic which sacrifices right 
means in favor of a perceived greater good, because unjust means also affect reality, and 
reality must always be considered when choosing to act. Prudential actions are those in 
which “not only the end of human action but also the means for its realization” are “in 
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keeping with the truth of real things.”20 Prudence is perfected on the natural level when a 
person is able to understand whether an action will lead to the realization of the good.21  
 Prudence, more than any other cardinal virtue, fulfills human potential by 
enabling the person to live according to human nature in concrete circumstances. 
Prudence ultimately directs the will to act in accordance with the truth of createdness—
both the acting person’s createdness, as well as that of everything else in the world. 22 As 
discussed above, for Aquinas the final end for which all people seek, knowingly or not, is 
the beatific vision found in union with God. The purpose of prudence, then, is to discover 
the actions which lead each individual person to closer to beatitude.23 Prudence enables a 
person to approach goodness by revealing which individual actions will lead to the 
ultimate good.24 The role of prudence is to understand the concrete situation of an 
individual and enable the person to respond in such a way that they can draw closer to 
God through their actions.25 
Justice is the virtue which enables a person to will the good for another.26 Justice 
as a natural virtue recognizes what goods are owed to other created persons by virtue of 
their createdness.27 Fundamentally, to act justly is “to owe something and to pay the 
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debt.”28 Having recognized the reality of another person, the role of justice is to enable a 
person to act for the good of another person and for society. Pieper’s understanding of 
justice as related to created human nature is most clearly revealed where he discusses 
unpayable debts of justice. These debts are unpayable, not because of an unjust action or 
a disregard for the restoration of justice, but as a consequence of human createdness. In 
order to acknowledge the debt of justice it is also necessary to recognize that, as Aquinas 
emphasizes, existence “for the sake of existing” is a good because it is a participation in 
the kind of existence God has.29 
Certain debts cannot be repaid because the gift given—existence—is of infinitely 
greater value than any action taken to repay the gift. These two unpayable debts of justice 
are the debt the created person owes to the Creator; and the debts a person owes to her 
parents. When that debt cannot be repaid, the “limits” of justice because of the nature of 
created order can be clearly perceived.30 A totally just order cannot be achieved simply 
because not everything that is owed can be repaid.31 This injustice, however, ought not be 
the kind of injustice which accepts wrongs; it is an injustice founded on the inability to 
repay a good, which nevertheless requires the repayment of the debt insofar as it can be 
paid.  
A person’s debt to her parents and her country is not able to be fully satisfied.32 
There can be no justice between a person and her parent, because it is impossible to repay 
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the gift of being given life. “The relation of children to parents [ought to be] experienced 
by the children as an obligation beyond the scope of full restitution.”33 Justice between a 
parent and a child is not predicated on equality, and therefore their relationship is not one 
of strict justice but, as Aquinas describes, paternal justice.34 This is a humbling realization 
which requires the acceptance of human existence as limited and finite. Similarly, but to 
an infinitely more intense degree, there can be no full repayment of the debt between a 
created being and the Creator. The Creator bestows on each person a right to justice 
which cannot be taken away.35 Each person is given absolute, “inalienable rights” 
because of their created nature.36 “Now a created thing begins to have something of its 
own by creation.”37 This inalienable right to justice is ours by virtue of our createdness.  
Although neither debt cannot be repaid, the endowment of the person with 
existence also creates moral obligations in addition to rights. Every person has an 
absolute duty to fulfill their moral obligations. Yet there can be no adequate recompense 
for the gift of being created.38 One cannot ever get “even” with God because God has 
gifted us with our being. The relation of the person to the Creator is therefore one of 
absolute obligation. Yet although “we cannot offer God an equal return” each person is 
obligated to “repay God as much as he can, by subjecting his mind to Him entirely.”39 
Pieper identifies this unpayable obligation of justice as the foundation as our duty to 
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worship, a duty which will be returned to later in the chapter.40 This obligation to God is 
also fulfilled, in part, by the practice of good works within society insofar as those acts 
are directed to God.41 The virtue of justice is therefore totally dependent on recognition of 
our createdness. Having been given existence, each person must practice justice because 
of the debt owed to God and to society. As a created being, each person also has the right 
to be treated justly by others.  
Each of the virtues serves to conform a person’s acts to the structure of reality.42 
Fortitude is expressed when acting in accordance with reality requires taking action 
which may endanger a person’s own life, because she oesteems some good (often justice) 
more than life itself.43 Fortitude is most characteristically expressed in that moment when 
a human person is “placed in a position to be injured or killed for the realization of the 
good” when “evil considered in terms of this world… [appears] as an overwhelming 
power” and yet, they choose to realize the good by enduring the evil.44 Fortitude 
presumes the possibility of injury to the acting person and yet the brave person acts 
regardless.45 Fortitude does not depend on the possibility of earthly victory; it esteems the 
good it seeks more highly than public vindication.46 Paraphrasing Aquinas, Pieper states 
that the truest expression of fortitude is the refusal to submit to evil even when all action 
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has been taken away. Thus, the highest expression of Christian fortitude is the willingness 
to be martyred.47 
The virtue of fortitude is shaped by the created nature of the human person—it is 
only ever necessary because of the vulnerability of the human person to harm, danger, 
and death.48 A body able to be endangered is required for fortitude; only embodied souls 
can consider the good and act rationally to pursue the good while endangering their 
bodies. Animals can endanger their bodies yet not rationally consider the good; 
disembodied spirits can consider the good yet do not have mortal lives to endanger. For 
Aquinas, fortitude also serves to “safeguard” the operation of the ratio “because fear of 
danger of death has the greatest power to make man recede from the good of reason.”49  
Fortitude presupposes knowledge of the good, acquired through the “direct 
cognition” of prudence.50 The brave person is not simply foolhardy or rash but 
understands what is truly good in the world, as well as to what specific danger they are 
exposing themselves.51 Although a person may not value their own life more than some 
good pursued, the brave person must value their life appropriately, or else their action is 
suicidal rather than motivated by bravery.52  The opposition to suicide requires a more 
subtle appreciation of the good of created existence, and an acknowledgment, as Aquinas 
draws out in On The Power of God, of the specific goodness of “[existing] for the sake of 
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existing.”53 The joys of human life are not to be “[tossed] aside and [esteemed] but 
lightly—unless, indeed, to preserve higher goods, the loss of which would injure more 
deeply the inmost core of human existence.”54 Christian fortitude always hopes to 
achieve—and confidently looks for heavenly—victory but as Pieper notes, it is not the 
“effort” but the “end” which is the goal of fortitude.55 
 Pieper describes temperance as the “discipline of… selfless self-preservation,” 
which is a habitual orientation toward the self to preserve a person’s life by guarding 
against “selfish perversion of the inner order.”56 Because temperance is so intimately 
related to the passions of the body, Pieper argues that intemperance is usually rooted in “a 
misconceived view of created reality.”57 The various aspects of temperance which Pieper 
discusses show that it serves to enable the person to clearly perceive reality by ordering 
the soul. Virtues which Pieper associates with temperance include “chastity, continence, 
humility, gentleness, mildness, studiositas”58—each of which is an opposite to some vice. 
Temperance is a difficult virtue to master because the temptations associated with the 
body are fundamental desires related to the preservation of life.  
Temperance recognizes that the human person is not equal to the Creator. Thus, 
the virtue of humility is essential to the practice of temperance because humility “looks to 
first God” in order to perceive the limitations inherent in the human body and moderate 
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the passions.59  Yet humility does not denigrate the human body. While pride asserts a lie 
against the truth of reality, humility allows the person to perceive what “by reason of 
God’s will, really is.”60 Pieper’s approach to temperance is derived from Aquinas’ 
affirmation of the goodness of existence; and specifically, Aquinas’ regard for the 
Incarnation of Christ. The human body has been redeemed through the action in which 
“human nature in Christ was assumed into a oneness of person” (that oneness of person 
being Christ’s divine personhood) “in order to repair it.”61 For all those living after the 
Incarnation, the human body is no longer necessarily evil but subject to God’s redeeming 
action.62 Moreover, the human body is used in the practice of the virtues and the pursuit 
of the end of human life. The temperate person therefore recognizes the lowliness of the 
human person as compared to the Creator without falsely regarding it as irredeemable 
and necessarily evil.  
What all the virtues associated with the cardinal virtue of temperance have in 
common is their purpose: to joyfully “relinquish the created for the sake of the 
Creator.”63 The most characteristic form of temperance is chastity64 as unchastity more 
than any other form of immoderation “begets a blindness of spirit… [and] splits the 
power of decision,” Pieper says.65 In chastity, Pieper reads Aquinas as affirming that 
sexual intercourse is created by God and therefore like the rest of creation is potentially 
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good—if fallen—rather than intrinsically evil.66 Despite the difficulty of becoming 
temperate, once achieved temperance “extends its ordering mastery down to the 
fountainhead from which the figure of moral man springs up unceasingly.”67 The 
temperate person lives a clear, measured, and peaceful life.  
Aquinas’ treatment of the disciplines which fall under temperance follow from a 
view of the human person which is a sober evaluation of the reality of sin. Each 
discipline guards against some misuse of the human desires and passions. Any kind of 
exaggerated desire for bodily pleasure such as attachment to food and drink will 
eventually lead to hebetudo sensus, a “dulling of the inner sense.”68 Each of these kinds 
of intemperance are a distorted desire for something good.69 These other desires are 
ultimately the prioritization of some other good over the ultimate end of human life, 
union with God. For Pieper, beatitude can only be received by a person whose soul has 
been preserved from disorder by temperance.  
THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES 
Pieper believed that the cardinal virtues could be achieved to some extent by any 
person. Because Pieper has a strong sense of the continuity of the natural virtues with 
their supernatural forms, in his essays Pieper also discusses each cardinal virtue as it 
exists in its grace-infused, Christian form. Each of the cardinal virtues in a Christian can 
be reoriented from whatever good the person seeks to the ultimate good. In contrast, the 
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theological virtues—faith, hope, and love—are specifically Christian virtues granted by 
an infusion of God’s grace. In their natural forms, these virtues can be directed toward 
any desired object and therefore are not virtues under Aquinas’ definition of the virtues as 
habits which cannot be directed toward evil. Faith, hope, and love can be directed to evil 
ends; thus, only by infused grace are they virtues.70 The origin of each theological virtue 
is grace, and the end of each is happiness in God.71 
While the cardinal virtues relate primarily to actions which can be perceived by 
external observers, hope, faith, and love have an interior character which can be difficult 
to perceive in another person. Moreover, in contemporary usage they are often 
understood to be emotions. While Pieper does not dismiss the emotional dimension of the 
three theological virtues, he argues that they are better understood as acts. Pieper 
expresses the relationship between the three in this way: faith perceives the “reality of 
God… Love affirms the Highest Good… Hope is the confidently patient expectation of 
eternal beatitude.”72 Pieper describes the theological virtues in terms which make it clear 
that they rely on the operation of the intellectus, rather than the faculty of discursive 
reasoning, the ratio. 
In his essay on faith, Pieper argues that faith is not only a virtue but is also 
necessary to assent to Christianity in the modern world. Pieper agrees with Karl Rahner 
that contemporary Christian theologians have provided “few intellectual tools” to respond 
to the crisis of faith in his contemporaries. In particular, advances in the sciences have 
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made it more difficult to conceive of God in the way pre-modern Christians did.73 Yet if, 
as Christianity asserts, we live in a world which is more than material and goodness is 
more than material; and if, for life to be complete, we must know the good; then, because 
our senses are limited, we must take an assertion of what goodness is on faith. Our 
natural, material knowledge will not satisfy our longing for the good.74 The solution to 
this crisis of knowledge of the spiritual world is belief. Faith carries us past the operation 
of the ratio into the realm of the intellectus, in which belief can be affirmed even where 
there is a lack of empirically verifiable evidence for that belief. Pieper defines ‘belief’ as 
“an unrestricted, unreserved, unconditional assent.”75 When a person has faith, he affirms 
that some statement reflects “real, objectively existent” reality,76 “[grasping] out of his 
own knowledge” what the statement means, and yet acknowledging that he is without the 
ability to “prove it.”77 Faith requires affirming specific witnesses to the truth as 
trustworthy and accepting the limitation of empirical knowledge in the realm of the spirit. 
Aquinas’ idea of revelation as the divine light which illuminates the intellect is a helpful 
way to frame Pieper’s discussion of this topic. 
For Pieper, faith is embodied in personal relationships. Faith originates in the will, 
which, since the will is always directed toward the love of some good, is oriented toward 
the “person of the witness,” affirming and “loving” them.78 A separate phenomenon often 
confused for faith is a conviction of the truth of a statement based on witnesses, scientia 
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testimonialis. This is not truly ‘belief’ but a reasoned conclusion which takes the 
witnesses as evidence.79 Pure belief rests on the acceptance of what a person states is true 
“for the sole reason that the person says so.”80 Belief is therefore impossible to separate 
from the relationship between the witness and the person who has faith; faith is 
necessarily present in individuals. The virtue of Christian faith requires belief in what the 
Christian Church teaches about God. While God is the only one capable of revealing the 
whole truth about reality, that truth is ordinarily communicated through the tradition of 
the Church. Pieper argues that faith in God must be able to be attained by every 
Christian,81 but there is not usually direct contact between an individual and God. So, 
every person who has faith, has faith in God through the mediation of the Church. 
“Fides implicita can enable the simplest mind, the one farthest removed 
from the original light, as well as the one only half-instructed, to 'belong' 
and have a share in the revealed truth—by virtue of his believing tie to one 
who knows at first hand… the Author [God]…”82 
This affirmation of belief in a person’s witness is the basis for faith. 
Pieper argues that there are four conditions that must be met before being able to 
acknowledge that revelation is indeed trustworthy. First, there must be acknowledgement 
that humanity is created. Second, acceptance of revelation requires maintaining a posture 
of “openness” and “receptivity” to the nature of the universe. Third, revelation requires 
welcoming the insights of others. Fourth, acceptance of revelation demands 
acknowledgment that there are forms of insight which are valid and which “have great 
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weight for certain persons while they may mean nothing to others.”83 These forms of 
insight can only be perceived by the intellectus, not deduced through logic. The 
intellectus looks to another person to discern their trustworthiness in the specific mode of 
intuition: “a rapid, penetrating and direct cognition of a unique kind.”84 Acceptance of 
revelation ultimately depends on a person’s willingness to accept another person as a 
source of knowledge. Acknowledging the insights of others and receptivity to alternate 
kinds of knowing open us to the kind of knowledge that comes by the grace of faith, 
which is a clearer perception of God than that available to the natural reason.85  
Pieper proposes a retrieval of Aquinas’ description of revelation as the divine light 
which enables the intellect to perceive realities of the world which would be otherwise 
hidden in darkness.86 The divine light “enables the intellect to understand in the same 
way as a habit makes a power abler to act.”87 As noted above, belief in Christian 
revelation depends on personal involvement. Revelation is not a neutral “fact” which has 
no consequences for the internal life; rather, the Christian “in accepting the message of 
the self-revealing God, actually partakes of the divine life therein announced.”88 The 
relational character of faith means that a statement cannot be extracted from the context 
in which it is spoken by a person, who must be judged as trustworthy in order for another 
person to have belief in the statement.89 In the context of Christian faith, this means that 
belief in God by way of belief in testimony about the divine life has a transformational 
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effect which creates a different reality in the believing person. “If God has really spoken, 
then it is not only good to believe him; rather the act of believing generates those things 
that in fact are goodness and perfection for man.”90  
Hope is the virtue which looks to the final end of human life, which cannot be 
achieved during life on earth. As a Christian virtue, hope pursues union with God and 
renewed creation. Because the object of hope will not be completely attained before 
death, hope is the virtue of the Christian life as it exists ‘on-the-way.’ The created person 
is always existing as incomplete in life and will remain incomplete until death.91 Hope 
responds to the incomplete satisfaction of the accomplishment of any earthly striving by 
affirming the goodness of created reality and humbly responding to God. Yet while this 
satisfaction is incomplete, it is still real. The “existential uncertainty” of human life 
should result in an understanding of man’s “finite nature that does not have being from 
himself and therefore does not possess himself… that takes refuge in the merciful power 
of God’s decrees.”92 Through grace, the Christian affirms that Christ is both the 
foundation and the fulfilment of hope.93 
The end the person looks for is beatitude, the state of perfect union which fulfills 
the longing for good which is the characteristic desire of human nature. Pieper cites 
Aquinas’ On the Power of God to affirm that being is by nature “directed toward a good 
[existence].”94 The human will desires to be satisfied by goodness, and will not rest until 
 
90 Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love. 85. 
91 Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love. 94. 
92 Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love. 129. 
93 Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love. 106. 





that fulfillment is attained.95 The hope of beatitude affirms truths about human nature, 
that the person is directed toward good, against the empirical evidence that the human 
body ends in death. Only through the perception through hope that human life is created 
for “fulfillment beyond time” can the person understand that the end of the body in death 
is not the meaning of human existence, nor even the final terminus of the body.96 Through 
an understanding of createdness and through the virtue of hope, it is possible to see 
beatitude as “the fulfilment objectively appropriate to our nature.”97 Hope recognizes the 
end for which human nature was designed, and anticipates satisfaction in God.98  
Natural hope does not assent to created human nature, and therefore fails to 
correctly perceive reality by seeking an imperfect good. Natural hope aims at the 
satisfaction of human desires with created things, which can never totally satisfy the 
infinite longing of the will. The person who relies on natural hope fails to perceive the 
limited way in which creation can satisfy the human desire for happiness. Natural hope 
aims at the greatest things which can be achieved by humanity, which are the object of 
the virtue of magnanimity. Since natural hope is founded on the “vigor” of the natural 
body, natural hope inevitably disappoints when the body fails. When a person can no 
longer work to achieve whatever they hope for, because of illness or age, they lose their 
ability to satisfy their longings for created goods.99 Presumption and despair are more 
subtle failures to hope for beatitude. Both anticipate a person’s judgment by God; despair 
anticipates damnation, and presumption anticipates the attainment of beatitude. The 
 
95 Aquinas, "ST." I, 20, 1.  
96 Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love. 95. Aquinas, "ST." I.II, 4, 5.  
97 Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love. 92. 
98 Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love. 104-5. 





particular failure they express is a failure to assent to createdness, as both presumption 
and despair arrogate the role of the Creator, who gives measure to the created person.100 
The Christian understanding of hope stands in sharp opposition to this 
materialistic understanding of the universe which rejects the Christian understanding of 
created human nature. Humility characterizes Christian hope by affirming the distance 
between the Creator and the creature. By assenting to created human nature, humility 
preserves the person from aiming at the “sham” greatest things and instead aims at what 
is really good.101 Unlike the manner in which the person presumes to pass judgment on 
her own soul, Pieper argues that Christian hope retains the separation between the Creator 
and creatura. Christian hope, above all, seeks the source of goodness, God.102  
 In the introduction to the volume of his essays on the theological virtues, Pieper 
acknowledges the difficult task of writing a treatise on the varieties of love, showing “the 
real basis for this identity” while maintaining their distinctions.103 In consequence, On 
Love is the longest of Pieper’s essays on the virtues. Pieper seeks to “grasp as much as 
[he] can of the multiplicity of the phenomenon we call ‘love.’”104 Love is sometimes 
chosen, sometimes undergone; it evaluates, and it can be costly.105 Love has an element 
of creation. Love requires “a preexistent relation between the lover and the beloved” yet 
it also “yields and creates unity.”106 One must be receptive to love, for love has an 
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essential kind of “approving contemplation” which must be present in the lover.107 The 
common element between each variety of love Pieper addresses—love for family, for 
food, for God, for friend, for lover—is affirmation of the good present in the beloved.  
 Pieper’s essay on love relies on his ideas of assent to createdness and the 
necessity to recognize the reality of the beloved person. For Pieper, it is impossible to 
define love without reference to human nature, which is “what man possesses and brings 
into the world with him by birth.”108 This nature has been given to the human person. 
Pieper argues that the human person is always the subject in the act of love, having 
agency and love of her own.109 The human person also has real and meaningful existence 
as creatura, “existence that is our own—God-given…to us to be truly our own.”110 
Human love is driven by our natures which are driven by desire for goodness; we are “by 
nature a totally needful being.” Moreover, we have no power to “change nor, certainly, 
destroy” this given nature, which is truly capable of giving love.111 All love is “grounded 
in the real” and refers to an existing person who is separate from the lover. Love requires 
some recognition of beauty and goodness in another.112 Drawing on Aquinas, Pieper 
argues that love for others, things, and God perceives something which is truly present in 
them.113 Human love is an affirmation and imitation of God’s ultimate affirmation.114 
Love signifies a fundamental approval which says to the beloved “It’s good that you 
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exist; it’s good that you are in this world.”115 The will must “assent to what already is” in 
the beloved in order to love them. The lover contemplates the beloved, as Aquinas 
describes it, “loving what it already possesses and rejoicing in that.”116 When we love 
people, we affirm their existence and wish that they might be “in God.”117 
Pieper argues with Aquinas that desire is not “human weakness” but ‘the 
indisputable beginning of all perfection in love.”118 The desire for happiness is a desire 
for “the happiness of love.”119 Pieper argues that what we need is not just existence but 
“to be loved by another person,” starting with our mothers, parents, and families, and 
extending throughout life into the world. We experience God’s loving affirmation of the 
goodness of our existence almost exclusively through the actions of others.120 But this 
action of others is, as noted above, rooted in the reality that all people have been 
individually “creatively conceived… willed and affirmed” by the Creator.121 The lover, 
whether human or Divine, recognizes that the beloved is not what they could be, but the 
true lover must perceive the end of the beloved and the good which the beloved could 
achieve, and love them into the fulfillment of that end.122 In turn, the beloved must be 
willing to accept love as a gift which is unearned and undeserving.123  
The common elements which underlie Pieper’s essays on the virtues are a focus 
on the need to assent to the createdness of the human person and the created world and to 
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perceive the shape of reality in order to pursue the end of human life, which is union with 
God. Each discussion of a specific virtue is brought into clearer focus by at least one of 
these themes. On Prudence discusses the perception of reality as it is necessary to act in 
pursuit of the end of human life. In On Justice, Pieper argues that the rights and 
obligations which shape our common life are bestowed on us by virtue of our created 
nature. On Fortitude considers how a person ought to pursue good, despite the human 
vulnerability to harm, and discusses what that good is. On Temperance discusses the 
ways in which the person must act in order to order their soul to seek the good. On Faith 
argues for the role of faith in perception of reality. On Hope relies on humility in order to 
place the created person in proper relationship to the Creator. Finally, On Love argues that 
love essentially is an affirmation of the goodness of some beloved thing or being.  
In his works on the seven virtues, Pieper gives a definition of these virtues which 
is contextualized by the themes considered in this thesis, but for Pieper the virtuous life is 
not complete without a movement from the practice of the specific virtues to an 
attainment of the end of the virtues. In Leisure the Basis of Culture and In Tune with the 
World: A Theory of Festivity, Pieper’s focus is the attainment of the goal of the virtues. 
Leisure and Festivity discuss the possibility of happiness on earth and consider how it can 
be attained—by practicing the virtues and by acknowledging the duties that come with 
created human nature.  
LEISURE, THE BASIS OF CULTURE 
Pieper’s discussion of leisure was written immediately after World War II, during 
the reconstruction of Germany after the defeat of the Nazi regime. He writes in response 





than (like pre-modern cultures) leisure.124 Modern work, Pieper proposes, had colonized 
culture to become “the whole of human activity and even of human life.” This ideology 
of “total work,” which Pieper describes as “totalitarian,” is on every point opposed to 
Pieper’s idea of human nature.125 Pieper poses the question to his readers: why must a 
society establish opportunities for leisure? His answer is that every healthy culture is 
founded on communal public worship, which makes life “truly human” and allows for a 
clear perception of reality.126 Life without culture has no meaning; it is both caused by 
and results in despair.  
At its foundation, total work relies solely on ratio—observation, judging, and 
discursive reasoning—rather than allowing for the priority of receptive perception and 
contemplation, intellectus. As discussed above, Aquinas presents a distinction between 
parts of the reason. The reason is comprised of both ratio, the “properly human” form of 
reason, and the simplex intuitus or simple vision which makes up the intellectus, the form 
of reason which is most similar to superhuman intelligences (the angels and God).127 For 
Pieper, “the process of knowing is the action of the two together.”128 In contrast, the 
modern world (Pieper references Kant as representative) denies either that the form of 
reason known as intellectus exists or that it has intellectual validity.129 Any knowledge 
achieved is earned by intellectual labor; nothing is gifted. Intellectual work is 
characterized by discursive reasoning, difficulty, and is oriented toward filling a specific 
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place in the “social system.”130 The pursuit of knowledge is only good insofar as it is 
oriented toward a specific need; the liberal arts are redefined to serve a utilitarian 
purpose. While the pre-modern world would speak of leisure and “not-leisure” (otium vs. 
negotium in Latin), the modern world of work reverses that: life is work or “not-work.”  
In contrast to the ideology of total work, Pieper cites Aquinas, who believed that it is 
necessary for the good of the whole society that there be those whose lives be devoted to 
contemplation.131 Pieper argues that to deny the existence of intellectus is to deny the 
possibility of philosophical reflection in the ancient sense, making any act of reason 
work.  
Total work distorts human nature because it springs from acedia, the vice opposed 
to hope. Pieper identifies acedia as a widespread modern habit which is ultimately a 
rejection of human personhood, a denial of humanity as creatura, and a refusal “to be as 
God wants him to be,” a non-assent to “what he really, fundamentally is.”132 This 
rejection of createdness results in a person unable to be at peace internally or externally, 
unable to reconcile one with oneself. Vices which follow from acedia are restless activity 
because a person cannot tolerate silence; 133 idleness stemming from a “deep-seated lack 
of calm;”134 and despair. Acedia results in a rejection of peace, whether that is expressed 
in frantic activity or paralysis. Pieper compares sleeplessness to idleness; neither fosters 
peace.135  
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Leisure as a positive act is absent from the ideology of total work. It can only be 
regarded as a cessation of work. “Leisure… appears as something wholly… without 
rhyme or reason, and, morally speaking, unseemly.”136 It is identified with unwillingness 
to work or the incapacity to accomplish anything. Pieper argues to the contrary that those 
characteristics are the fruit of acedia. Leisure, instead, results in internal peace which 
enables the silent apprehension of reality.137 Like contemplation, leisure is a kind of 
internal act which entails welcoming the mystery of creation into one’s being.138 “Leisure 
is a resting in which one takes contemplative delight at being and in being.”139 Leisure is 
made possible by a fundamental “consent” given to a person’s own createdness and all 
creation, the entire universe. “It is like the tranquil silence of lovers, which draws its 
strength from concord.”140 This aspect of love and affirmation can overflow into 
celebration and even the most heightened form of affirmation—the festival. Unlike 
ordered daily work, which has some aspect of difficulty, or disordered total work, which 
revels in its own difficulty, leisure is experienced as restorative.141 Like contemplation, 
the restorative nature of leisure is attained by gift alone. Unlike “days off” which are 
granted in order to restore the worker to be able to continue working, leisure cannot be 
instrumentalized to serve an end other than itself; leisure is its own end.142  
Leisure is not a “social function”—it is a practice that operates on a totally 
different plane of existence than the working life. It is not a pause in work—it is an 
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expression of the fully human life. Because it is open to all, leisure provides a way for 
every person to pass from the life of activity into the active silence of contemplation. 
Every person needs the space to enter into leisure. The ideology of total work, Pieper 
believes, presents a real threat to “the preserve of freedom, of education and culture, and 
that undiminished humanity which views the world as a whole.”143 The Soviets, who 
Pieper encountered in East Berlin and East Germany before the Berlin Wall was built, 
attempted to “obliterate a contrast… between the classes” by bringing everyone to the 
same level and proscribing unapproved cultural expressions.144 This resulted in the entire 
society being engulfed in the ideology of total work in which all activities in society were 
required to meet a societal need.145  
Leisure ultimately requires a rejection of the claim which the ideology of total 
work makes to possess all of existence and a reaffirms divine sovereignty over all 
creation. As Pieper remarks: 
“There can be no such thing in the world of ‘total labor’ as space which is 
not used on principle; no such thing as a plot of ground, or a period of 
time withdrawn from use. There is in fact no room in the world of ‘total 
labor’ either for divine worship or for a feast: because the ‘worker’s’ 
world, the world of ‘labor’ rests solely on the principle of rational 
utilization.”146 
 
Without the justification of divine worship, Pieper argues that there is no reason to not 
use everything ‘rationally.’ The original “days of rest” in Western culture—in Greek and 
Roman society as well as Jewish and Christian societies—were set aside for worship. 
Both festivity and leisure find their “possibility [and] ultimate justification… in divine 
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worship.”147 Pieper argues that a society conducive to humane life would allow for space, 
money, and time for each individual to pursue activity, leisure, “which cannot be put at 
the disposal of useful ends.”148  
IN TUNE WITH THE WORLD: A THEORY OF FESTIVITY 
A Theory of Festivity is a recapitulation and intensification of the argument made 
in Leisure the Basis of Culture, written nearly fifteen years later. Rather than concentrate 
attention on the world of work, which is opposed to leisure, Festivity discusses the 
attitude which allows for reception of the gift of celebration. All of Josef Pieper’s works 
on the virtues, and even Leisure, the Basis of Culture, orient the person to receive the gift 
of festivity in different ways. Certain virtues assist the person to assent to her own 
createdness; other virtues help the person to perceive the world; still other virtues are 
necessary to build a social order which is oriented to the final end of the human person. 
Leisure itself is expressed, in its highest form, as a virtue. In A Theory of Festivity Pieper 
combines these various ideas to show how festivity enables the person to become fully 
human by bringing earthly life in contact with eternity. Although in A Theory of Festivity, 
Pieper cites Aquinas significantly less than most of his other works, the ideas which are 
present in it rest on a similar response to the world: assent to human createdness, 
perception of reality; and pursuit of the highest good of human existence, which is union 
with God. 
Immediately prior to the composition of Festivity, Pieper had spent several 
months travelling through Asia, visiting cities in India including Calcutta where he 
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experienced the Durga festival; he visited Darjeeling; he saw the ceremonies surrounding 
death in Banaras as well as a “living goddess” in Nepal; and he encountered Hindus 
worshipping at a shrine of St. Anthony in Madras. During his time in India, he had the 
chance to have academic discussions with both Hindus and Buddhists but found the 
worship and ritual he encountered “much more exciting and also more convincing,” 
being “always fascinated anew when religious feelings are lived out.”149 Shortly before 
the trip to India, Pieper visited Mexico where he was struck by the intensity of devotion 
to Our Lady of Guadalupe in Mexico.150 Pieper’s reactions to these experiences varied 
but in general, he was more sympathetic (if not necessarily approving of) what had arisen 
within the older traditions. Interestingly, possibly his strongest negative reaction was 
during his encounter with followers of Ramakrishna, who struck him as artificial.151 In 
his autobiography, Pieper discusses the central concept of Festivity, which he describes as 
“consent to the world.” The composition of Festivity, Pieper notes, was strongly 
influenced by the multiple Hindu festivals he had encountered during his time in India. 152 
The inner experience of festivity is “barred to non-initiates”—it is impossible to 
understand what the essence of a festival is unless you have experienced it.153 In Festivity, 
Pieper therefore draws from the festivities he has experienced, which are primarily 
Christian festivals. For Christians, there are two primary festivals—Sunday, and Easter. 
Sunday is a festival which commemorates the divine rest and that “God himself” by 
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creating the world “affirms and loves” every created thing “all of them without 
exception.”154 Easter is the characteristic Christian festival, for the resurrection celebrates 
a stronger, eternal re-affirmation of God’s creating love.155 Pieper’s discussion of the 
Christian festivals is intended to contrast with the pseudo-festivals he gives as counter-
examples—festivals celebrated during the French Revolution, in Nazi Germany, and in 
the Soviet Union.156 Pieper’s objection to these festivals is that by expressing an incorrect 
view of reality—one which crowns labor as the sole source of meaning in life—they do 
not succeed in their purpose of celebration. To be true festivity, it must reveal something 
of the true face of reality. 
Festivity is, like the virtues, necessarily practiced by embodied human persons. 
For Pieper, a basic characteristic of festivity is rest from useful work—festivity is in fact 
the most heightened form of leisure, described above. Rest is necessary for the created 
person, and it is essential that a festival day be a pause from work.157 Festivity also brings 
with it an obligation to worship or give some recognition to the Creator, as discussed in 
the section on justice. Pieper identifies the meaning at the heart of festivity as worship of 
God, or a god, through assent to the goodness of creation. Some token of the goodness of 
creation is offered back in every festival. This characteristic of festivity is present in 
every human celebration; for example, the festivals of the ancient Greeks and Romans 
were seen as “holy time” necessarily involving some kind of ritual sacrifice.158 Unlike the 
claims which total work makes, this sacrifice is not imprudent or intemperate; it is the 
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just response to createdness. Yet the texts of the Catholic mass (Pieper here is discussing 
the pre-conciliar texts of the Roman canon of the mass) also explicitly offer praise, 
thanksgiving, petition, and sacrifice to God.159 The reason for worship, in both cases, is 
hope that through these rites the people “will be vouchsafed a share in the superhuman 
abundance of life” which is a “hoped-for gift,” not anything that can be purchased or 
even reliably procured.160 The arts are also usually present as the medium through which 
the senses can perceive the spirit of festival.161 
Festivity, like leisure, engages the intellectus not the ratio, enabling the person to 
achieve a higher degree of openness to reality than is generally present in daily life. True 
festivity arises from looking “upon reality whole” while simultaneously pausing from 
work oriented toward a practical end.162 The element of contemplation in festivity is a 
“relaxation of the strenuous fixation of the eye” on the daily life of work.163 Festivity 
allows for peaceful, open perception of all of reality. Those who assent to the world can 
celebrate any particular occasion; those whose response to the world is negation can 
never rejoice. Pieper defines festivity directly in terms of affirmation.  
“To celebrate a festival means: to live out, for some special occasion and 
in an uncommon manner, the universal assent to the world as a whole.” 
 
The existence of a great good which is able to be taken into the person elicits a 
response—joy.164 Thus, festivals of birth and marriage are celebrated because existence 
itself is affirmed as good. “Underlying all festive joy… there has to be an absolutely 
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universal affirmation extending to the world as a whole, to the reality of all things and the 
existence of man himself.”165 Festivity affirms the world as good even in the face of the 
tragic. In fact, festivity is most truly moving when the celebrants look at the whole of 
reality and “[offer] the response of joy”—that response can itself be a sacrifice.166 Even 
those festivals (Pieper mentions Good Friday) which remember the dead are celebrated 
when there is an affirming sense that “grief, sorrow, death are accepted and therefore 
affirmed, as meaningful in spite of everything.”167 Those who resist this affirmation are 
unable to find rest, contemplation, or festivity. 
Yet festivity is not a binary opposite to work or a hatred of daily life.168 It requires 
that the ordered round of daily work exist, for “a festival can arise only out of the 
foundation of a life whose ordinary shape is given by the working day.”169 Lack of a 
purpose in life precludes both festivity and meaningful work.170 Work has meaning when 
it provides some concrete good to the world or produces the goods which are used at the 
celebration.171 Festivity requires the sacrifice of time which could be devoted to work and 
of the goods produced by work. It requires time because festivity requires time be set 
aside for the celebration, and it requires goods—both the goods used in the celebration 
and those which would have been produced in the time spent working. “A festival is 
essentially a phenomenon of wealth… of existential richness.”172 These goods are 
renounced for profitable use because of love of a greater good.  
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Negation of the world is expressed in acedia, the vice opposed to hope. Acedia 
stems from a rejection of the goodness of the world, which makes festivity impossible. 
Thus, hope is a virtue necessary to combat the temptation to negate the goodness of 
existence because of “historical evil” and the many kinds of horrors present in the 
world.173 A different kind of negation exists when “artificial holidays” are celebrated. 
Pseudo-festivals occur when people, rather than accepting the happiness of being created 
as a gift, arrogate the power over creation which rightly belongs to God, and refuse God 
praise.174 This is a failure of prudence and an inability to see the world as it is. Some 
pseudo-festivals relatively harmless—local memorials and parades. Others are 
deliberately conceived to compete with or replace traditional festivals; for example, the 
created “holidays” of the French Revolution which parodied Catholic worship; or the 
pseudo-festivals of Nazi Germany.175 These pseudo-festivals were celebrated because 
festivity was recognized as necessary for human life, yet they were false because they 
celebrated human happiness as already having been achieved by human effort, and 
participation was coerced, rather than spontaneous.176 
While false festivals suppress affirmation of the real world, a true festival allows 
for true perception of reality and therefore affirmation of the goodness of the world. It 
necessarily includes worship of the Creator. Crucially, festivity opposes a world of total 
work. A festival is celebrated when a society refuses to see the world as solely given over 
to productive use, deliberately sacrificing the products of work for the feast. This 
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sacrifice places the duty of divine worship at the center of human life and denies that 
created goods can satisfy human desire. Festivals require and reorient the human gaze to 
perceive  
“the goodness of reality taken as a whole which validates all other 
particular goods and which man himself can never produce nor simply 
translate into social or individual welfare. He truly receives it only when 
he accepts it as pure gift. The only fitting way to respond to such gift is: 
by praising God.”177 
 
Celebration always ends with praise. It is only through feast that the end of human life, 
unity with God, is made present for a time on earth. At a true festival, “man passes 
beyond the barriers of this present life on earth” and into divine time.178 This is a 
mysterious statement, drawn from the early Church. By this, Pieper asserts that festivity 
is a way that the person is able to be drawn up into God, through the gift of an experience 
of festivity. “In regarding man and world as creatura we imply that our own existence, as 
well as that of things, is founded upon the non-temporal, non-successive, and therefore 
still continuing act of creation…. Not that we can, by our power and volition, ‘step out of 
time.’ Nevertheless, to do so remains among our real potentialities.” This experience is 
pure gift, not at all an earned or even expected accompaniment to the festival. Yet it is 
through festival that this experience can be attained.179  
The parallels between Pieper’s conception of leisure and festivity are obvious and 
intentional. Leisure and festivity require the individual and societal practice of the 
virtues. They require prudence to identify the nature of reality and select the correct 
course of action. They require justice to determine what each person, as well as God, is 
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owed. They require fortitude to reject false conceptions of reality even in the face of 
martyrdom—as those who rejected Nazi pseudo-festivals faced. They require 
temperance, the virtue which orders the life of each person. For the Christian, leisure and 
festivity also require faith that the God will provide for needs, even when work is 
deliberately relegated to a part of life. They require hope that the beatitude sought 
through festivity is real. And they require love of God and desire to worship him before 
every other created good. Because festivity is an intensification of leisure, their origin, 
opposite, and meaning are ultimately the same. The affirmation of goodness practiced by 
those who take time to rest and celebrate is an expression of love of the world and 



















Josef Pieper’s life was dedicated to seeking the truth that can be found through the 
pursuit of philosophy. From an early age, he was dedicated to understanding the world 
through philosophy as well as the arts. For Pieper, the western Christian tradition in 
which he primarily situated his work was expressed in an exemplary form in the work of 
Thomas Aquinas. In particular, Aquinas’ conception of what it means to be a created 
person had a lasting impact on Pieper’s moral philosophy. His work was situated in an 
area unpopular with his contemporaries, frequently touching on the meaning of being 
created by God as it relates to philosophy rather than theology. Josef Pieper knew the 
potential consequences of living a virtuous life in a disordered society. His work was 
colored by his experience of life in Germany before and during the second World War, 
which convinced him of the necessity of the well-ordered life of virtue. His opposition to 
the modern world’s fetishization of work above all other goods was rooted in an 
acknowledgment of human createdness including the limitations inherent in a physical 
body. Yet Pieper’s work is fundamentally hopeful. Drawing on Aquinas’ vision of 
beatitude, Pieper consistently argued that every person has the ability to seek and find 
ultimate happiness.  
While best known for his work Leisure, the Basis of Culture, Pieper’s other works 
deserve to be more widely known and studied. Recently, scholars have begun to relate 
important concepts within individual works to others; notably, Warne, Wargo, and 
Guilbeau have written essays on specific connecting themes between works. Bernard 
Schumacher also deserves recognition for his identification of the importance of Aquinas’ 





creation or the Creator, to Pieper’s philosophy. However, each of these works is 
somewhat limited in scope and Pieper’s work deserves to be studied in greater depth. In 
particular, similarities between virtue ethics and Pieper’s thought should be identified and 
studied. 
Drawing on Schumacher’s insight, this paper has identified three instances of this 
application of Aquinas thought in Pieper’s essays. First, Pieper constantly emphasizes the 
necessity of human assent to being fashioned by a creating God. Second, he argues that 
the perception of reality is enabled by the human reason which is an unchangeable part of 
created human nature. Third, for Pieper, the meaning and purpose of human life is 
fulfilled in the end of human existence, which is to contemplate God. These specific ideas 
allow for the reading of Pieper's works in the context of Aquinas’ metaphysics of 
creation. Without understanding this context, Pieper’s work cannot be understood in the 
way he meant it to be. Moreover, Pieper’s repeated return to these ideas in his works on 
ethics and practical morality demonstrates the essential unity of Pieper’s practical and 
speculative philosophy. 
As discussed in the first two chapters of this thesis, certain aspects of Aquinas' 
thought play such an important role in Pieper's work that he cannot be understood 
without considering them.  First, the reader of Pieper must understand his position that 
the person must assent to her own existence as a created person in the world. This 
requires an acceptance of human nature as having been created by the measuring thought 
of God, as discussed in the first section of the first chapter. Pieper appropriates Aquinas’ 
theological and anthropological insights to support a Christian ethic of the virtuous 





reality is enabled by the mind of God, the origin of all that is. While we cannot know 
reality in a complete and all-encompassing way, by nature we are created to truly know it, 
albeit in a limited way. This knowledge is further made possible by the nature of other 
created things, which echo God in the way that they reveal their own existence. Third, 
each human life, having emerged from God, is intended to end in union with God. The 
goodness which the human person longs for is first identified in the longing for happiness 
that the human soul cannot help but experience. Pieper argues that this happiness is only 
totally satisfied in the beatific vision, attained as a gift but made possible through the 
contemplation of God.  
What is at stake in Pieper’s vision of the world? If Pieper is correct, our 
philosophy and theology of work and leisure in the modern world is often seriously 
incorrect about human nature, the virtues, and the ultimate meaning of life. Pieper 
proposes a radical solution to the ills of modern society: the retrieval of the Christian 
philosophical tradition in order to reorder society around the necessity for rest and 
leisure. Pieper himself took his proposal seriously—rather than teach in a prestigious 
position at one of the university faculties he was invited to join, Pieper deliberately chose 
to teach teachers and non-specialists in order to reach as many people as possible. 
Pieper’s goal was to popularize certain teachings of the western Christian tradition which 
had been neglected by his society. Pieper argues for a return to a society which prioritized 
divine worship over human achievement, a way of life which has primarily been written 
off as outdated or irrelevant.  
Pieper challenges the modern academy in method as well as content. While many 





prioritization of teaching outside the academy is rare, and poses the question: is it 
appropriate for more philosophers and theologians to direct efforts outside the academy? 
Even in Catholic institutions, there can be a disconnect between the priorities of the 
dioceses and the academic theologians. Massimo Faggioli, at the 2019 meeting of the 
Catholic Theological Society of America Annual Meeting, addressed this point in blunt 
words. After describing the relations between academic theologians and the Catholic 
hierarchy as one of “mutual estrangement and alienation,” he argues that this alienation 
threatens Catholic academic theology more than it does the hierarchy, and warns: “There 
is no detachment from the institutional church that does not entail also some detachment 
from the real people of God.”1 Faggioli’s argument is that a Catholic theology that 
operates in isolation from the Catholic Church risks losing its identity as Catholic. This is 
a sobering challenge. Pieper perhaps can serve as a model for a re-engagement with the 
wider Church.  
Fundamentally, Pieper was a philosopher who was concerned with finding the 
truth and teaching it to others. Like Thomas Aquinas, from whom he gained so much 
inspiration, Josef Pieper sought to clearly perceive reality in order to communicate that 
truth. Pieper’s works were deeply steeped in the works of Aquinas; to understand Pieper, 
it is necessary to appreciate the ways Aquinas had a deep impact on Pieper’s thought. In 
Pieper’s essays on the virtuous life, it is particularly important to understand certain 
concepts related to Aquinas’ metaphysics of creation. Pieper’s moral philosophy argues 
that the human person must acknowledge her own createdness and so also the existence 
 
1 Massimo Faggioli, "Address" (paper presented at the Catholic Theological Society of America, 





of the Creator. Assenting to createdness reveals the limitations of created nature. Through 
a patient, welcoming attention to the exterior created world, it is possible to perceive 
reality and take the right actions in response. This enables the practice of the virtues. 
Through the virtuous life, the human person is conformed to ideal human nature and thus 
understands and acknowledges the good which they are created to desire, beatitude. 
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